Interest Group Litigation as Administrative Influence

Julian Dean, Politics

Wed, 05/03/2017 - 12:00pm
438 Robertson Hall
Graduate Students

LEGS, or "Law-Engaged Graduate Students," meets during the academic year to discuss a work in progress by one of our Graduate Associates. Academic papers, dissertation proposals, and dissertation chapters have been presented at these meetings, to an audience of fellow graduate students.

Abstract:  "Many political scientists have examined efforts of private interest groups to influence government policymaking in the legislative and executive branches. However, the role of interest groups as gatekeepers for judicial review of agency rulemaking has not been studied as a strategic lever for policy influence. I present an original theory in which interest groups use notice-and-comment to signal their likelihood of prevailing in litigation against an agency at the DC circuit, and conclude with an empirical test using evidence from 11 years of SEC rulemaking."

Julian Dean
Ph.D. Candidate, Politics

Julian Dean '13 is a PhD Candidate in American Politics. His current research focuses on executive branch policymaking, interest groups, and separation of powers. He previously earned an A.B. in Politics and the Program in Political Economy from Princeton.