Litigation as Policy Influence

Julian Dean, Politics

Date: 
Wed, 05/03/2017 - 12:00pm
Location: 
438 Robertson Hall
Audience: 
Graduate Students


LEGS, or "Law-Engaged Graduate Students," meets during the academic year to discuss a work in progress by one of our Graduate Associates. Academic papers, dissertation proposals, and dissertation chapters have been presented at these meetings, to an audience of fellow graduate students.

Abstract:  "A number of scholars have examined the ability of interest groups to influence policymaking in the executive branch, but the strategic and policy implications of interest groups’ role as gatekeepers for judicial review of has not been studied. I present an original theory in which interest groups have private information about proposed regulations and use notice-and-comment to credibly signal their likelihood of prevailing in costly litigation against an agency. In equilibrium, an agency incorporates interest group preferences into its final rule when its chances of winning in court are low, but takes its chances otherwise. I find support for the theory with empirical evidence from 11 years of SEC rulemaking."

Julian Dean
Ph.D. Candidate, Politics

Julian Dean '13 is a PhD Candidate in American Politics. His current research focuses on executive branch policymaking, interest groups, and separation of powers. He previously earned an A.B. in Politics and the Program in Political Economy from Princeton.