

Gideon A. Rosen

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Education

Princeton University	1984-1989	Ph.D. 1992
Columbia University	1980-1984	A.B., <i>summa cum laude</i>

Honors and awards

Mellon Foundation New Directions Fellowship, 2002  
President's Award for Distinguished Teaching, Princeton, 1997  
Jonathan Dickinson Bicentennial Preceptorship, Princeton 1995-98  
CRLT Post-Doctoral Teaching Fellowship, University of Michigan, 1992  
Distinguished Teaching Award, College of Literature Science and the Arts, University of Michigan, 1991, 1992.  
Whiting Fellowship, Princeton, 1988-89  
John Jay Scholar, Columbia, 1980-84; Phi Beta Kappa

Employment

Hauser Fellow in Global Law, New York University Law School	2003- 2004
Professor, Princeton University	2002-
Associate Professor, Princeton University	1998-2002
Assistant Professor, Princeton University	1993-1998
Assistant Professor, University of Michigan	1992-1993
Visiting Professor, University of Auckland	Summer, 1991
Instructor, Philosophy Dept, University of Michigan	1989-1992

Areas of Specialization

Metaphysics; Epistemology; Philosophy of Mathematics; Ethics.

Other Areas of Competence

Philosophy of Science; Philosophy of Language;  
Logic; Aesthetics; Philosophy of Law.

Ph.D. Thesis: *Remarks on Modern Nominalism*. (Paul Benacerraf, supervisor)

## PUBLICATIONS

### Book

*A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalist Reconstrual in Mathematics* (with John P. Burgess), Oxford University Press 1997.

### Articles

"Modal Fictionalism," *Mind*, vol. 99 (July 1990) pp. 327-354.

"Review of Paul K. Moser, *Knowledge and Evidence*," *The Philosophical Review*, 101: 3 (July 1992), pp. 681-4.

"A Problem for Fictionalism about Possible Worlds," *Analysis* 53 (2) (April 1993), 71-81.

"The Refutation of Nominalism(?)", *Philosophical Topics* 21 (2) (Spring 1993), 149-186

"What is Constructive Empiricism?", *Philosophical Studies* 74 (1994), 143-78

"Realism" (with Peter Railton) in J. Kim and E Sosa, eds., *Blackwell's Companion to Metaphysics*, (Blackwell, 1994)

"Objectivity and Modern Idealism", in M. Michael and J. O'Leary-Hawthorne, eds., *Philosophy in Mind*, (Dordrecht: Kluwer) 1994

"Modal Fictionalism Fixed," *Analysis* 55 (2) (April 1995), 67-73.

"The Shoals of Language," *Mind* vol. 104 (July 1995), pp. 599-609

"Armstrong on Classes as States of Affairs", *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 73, no. 4 (December 1995) 612-25.

"Realism" in *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy Supplementary Volume* (MacMillan, 1996)

"For the Love of Cog," (Review of Daniel C. Dennett, *Kinds of Minds*), *Voice Literary Supplement*, September 1996, 16-17.

"Who Makes the Rules Around Here?" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 57:1 (March 1997) pp.163-172.

Critical Study of Blackburn's *Essays in Quasi-Realism*, *Noûs* 32:3 (1998) 386-405.

Critical Study of Maddy's *Naturalism in Mathematics*, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* (1999)

"Brandom on Normativity, Intentionality and Modality", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 63:3 (November 2001), pp. 611-23.

"Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism", *Philosophical Perspectives 15* (Metaphysics), J. Tomberlin, ed., 2001, pp. 60 – 91.

"Abstract Objects", *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (latest version: May 2001)

"The Case for Incompatibilism", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, LXIV: 3 (May 2002), pp. 700 - 708.

"Peacocke on Modality", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, LXIV: 3 (May 2002), pp. 641 -648

"Composition as a Fiction" (with Cian Dorr) in Richard Gale, ed., *Blackwell's Guide to Metaphysics*, Blackwell, 2002.

"A Study in Modal Deviance", in *Conceivability and Possibility*, Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne, eds. Oxford University Press, 2002.

"Culpability and Ignorance", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, CIII: Part 1, 2003.

"Truth-makers for Negative Existentials" (with David Lewis), postscript to Lewis, "Things qua Truth-makers", in *Real Metaphysics*, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, ed., Routledge, 2003.

"Platonism, Semiplatonism, and the Caesar Problem", *Philosophical Books*, July 2003, vol. 44, iss. 3, pp. 229-244(16).

"Worldly Indeterminacy: A Rough Guide" (with Nicholas Smith), *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, March 2004, vol. 82, no. 1, pp. 185-198(14).

Reprinted in *Lewisian Themes*, Frank Jackson and Graham Priest, eds., Oxford University Press, 2004.

"Skepticism about Moral Responsibility", *Philosophical Perspectives 18* (Ethics), 2004, pp. 295 – 313

"Nominalism Reconsidered", (with John P. Burgess), in S. Shapiro, ed., *Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Mathematics*, Oxford University Press, 2005.

“The Limits of Contingency” in F. MacBride and C. Wright, eds. *Being Committed*, Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

“Problems in the History of Fictionalism”, in M. Kalderon, ed., *Fictionalism in Metaphysics*, Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

“Paul Benacerraf”, forthcoming in *The Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers*, Thoemmes Press.

“Modern Nominalism”, forthcoming in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, MacMillan.

## Invited Papers

"Constructive Empiricism and Everyday Life," University of Michigan Colloquium on Laws of Nature, April 1990.

"Platonism and Supervenience," Harvard University Philosophy Colloquium, February 1991.

"Against Fregean Platonism", University of Auckland, New Zealand, June 1991.

"Against Fregean Platonism", Australian National University, July 1991.

"Field's Case for Mathematical Antirealism", University of Wollongong, July 1991.

"Fregean Platonism", University of Sydney, July 1991.

"The Status of Value and the Project of Metaphysics", Monash University conference on Value in Action, August 1991.

"Scientism and Ontology", CUNY Graduate Center, February 1992.

"Scientism and Ontology", Wayne State University, March 1992.

"A Proof of Non-Cognivism from the Philosophy of Literature", University of Michigan Undergraduate Philosophy Club, November 1992.

"Objectivity and Modern Idealism", Johns Hopkins University, November 1994.

"On Being Real", New York University, December 1994.

"Normativity and Meaning", CUNY Graduate Center, February 1996.

"What is the Normativity of Meaning?", Wesleyan University, March 1996.

"Brandom on Normativity", Wesleyan University, March 1996.

"What is the Normativity of Meaning?", Berkeley, December 1996.

"What is the Normativity of Meaning?", Arizona State University, December 1996.

"Wikforss on Normativity", APA Central Division, April 1997.

"Peacocke's New Theory of Concepts", Conference on Methods, New York, May 1997.

“Normativity and Meaning”, MIT, October 1997.

“Anti-Realism and Worldly Indeterminacy”, Harvard, March 1998.

“Normativity and Content”, University of Michigan, April 1998.

"Velleman on the Aim of Belief", Chapel Hill Colloquium, November, 1998.

“Naturalism, Fictionalism and the Epistemology of the Abstract” Rutgers, December 1998

“Naturalism, Fictionalism, etc. ...” Syracuse, March 1999

—————, University of Chicago, April 1999

“Normativity and Meaning:, University of Chicago, April 1999.

“Naturalism, Fictionalism ...” University of Pennsylvania, April 1999

“Naturalism, Fictionalism ...” APA Central Division, May 1999.

"Responsibility and Moral Ignorance", University of Colorado, Boulder, September 1999

"Brandom on Normativity, Modality and Intentionality", Brown University, November 1999.

"Borges, Fiction and Metaphysics", for a symposium on Anne Meara's "Down the Garden Paths", George Street Playhouse, New Brunswick, NJ, December 1999.

"Nominalism and Epistemic Relativism", Stanford University, February 2000.

"The Limits of Contingency", Arché Conference: Being Committed, University of St. Andrews, June 2000.

"How Old is the Earth (and How Do We Know)? Chapin School, Princeton, NJ, October, 2000.

"Nominalism and Epistemic Relativism", University of Delaware, November 2000.

"Mathematical Realism and Epistemic Relativism", SOFIA Conference, Oaxaca, Mexico, January, 2001

"Moral Ignorance", Union College, Schenectady, NY, February 2001.

"Two Concepts of Contingency", Pittsburgh/Carnegie Mellon Graduate Student Conference, Key Note Address, March 2001.

"Hurley on Responsibility", Urbino Conference on Ethics, Urbino, Italy, June 2001.

"Fine on Things and their Matter", Metaphysical Mayhem VI, Syracuse, August 2001.

"The Limits of Contingency", McGill, November 2001.

"Responsibility and Ignorance", McGill, November 2001.

"Responsibility and Moral Ignorance", NYU Colloquium in Law and Philosophy, November 2001.

"Responsibility and Moral Ignorance", Harvard, February 2002

"Responsibility and Ignorance", Vassar College, March 2002

"Responsibility and Ignorance", Princeton/Rutgers Graduate Student Conference, Keynote Address, Princeton, April 2002

"Responsibility and Moral Ignorance", University of Edinburgh, June 2002.

"Merricks on Counterpart Theory", Metaphysical Mayhem VII, Syracuse, August 2002.

"Culpability and Ignorance", Aristotelian Society, London, November 2002

"Moral Stupidity and Affected Ignorance", Oxford Philosophical Society, November 2002.

"Birnbaum the Obtuse and Other Tales of Ignorance and Responsibility", University of Michigan, Spring Colloquium, March, 2003

"The Cardinal Thesis of Fregean Platonism", APA Pacific Division Meeting, San Francisco, 2003, March 2003.

"Birnbaum the Obtuse", *Geneva Conference on Ethics and Practical Reasoning*, June 2003.

"Is Nominalism Self-Defeating?" University of Kentucky Symposium on Abstract Objects, October 2003.

"Doubts about Culpability", CUNY Colloquium, October 2003.

"Doubts about Culpability", NYU Law School, October 2003.

“Skepticism about Moral Responsibility”, Amherst College, April 2004.

“Logic and Reasoning” (with Paul Boghossian), APA Central Division, Chicago, April 2004

“Chalmers on Phenomenal Content”, La Pietra Conference on Consciousness, Florence, Italy, June 2004

“Realism about Mathematical Objects”, Cambridge Conference on Mathematical Knowledge, University of Cambridge, July 2004.

“Greenberg on Legal Positivism”, comment delivered at the Princeton University Conference on Ronald Dworkin’s Jurisprudence, September 2004.

“Skepticism about Moral Responsibility”, USC, December 2004

“The Alethic Conception of Responsibility”, University of Chicago, April 2005