Socioeconomic rights in constitutional law: explaining America away

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The apparent absence of a socioeconomic commitment from United States constitutional law gives rise to continuing debate, although the case is unclear that this omission has any likely bearing on the actual performance of American governments in the social welfare field. Is there any other possible reason for treating the omission as problematic? If so, might the omission nevertheless be explained in terms consistent with belief that some kind of socioeconomic commitment ideally belongs in the constitutional law of a country like the U.S.? After briefly reviewing the uneasy instrumental case for a constitutionalized socioeconomic commitment, this article suggests why inclusion may all the same be demanded as a matter of political-moral principle. It then canvasses possible responses to the American case. These include both a possible denial that socioeconomic guarantees are in fact lacking from U.S. constitutional law, and a possible claim that omitting them is the correct choice for the U.S. as a matter of “non-ideal” political morality.

Is the United States of America a welfare state? Does United States constitutional law contain any socioeconomic guarantees? Whichever way your snap answers go – maybe “no” and “no” for most readers – you can get an argument in return. It is clear why people care about the first question, less clear why anyone cares about the second, and clear again that many do care about the second. Cass Sunstein sees a need to explain why the American Constitution lacks what it lacks.1 The “social rights” question begets books and more books, devoted not just to programmatic issues but in at least equal measure to questions of higher-law imprecation that can make no difference for anyone’s life without concrete

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implementation from lawmakers and bureaucrats.\(^2\) I have nagged at the higher-law imprecation question over a span of forty years.\(^3\) Why?

Below, I explore possible reasons for caring about that question. I then turn to a consideration of how anyone who does care about it might respond to the case—according to Cass Sunstein, the maverick case—of United States constitutional law.\(^4\)

1. Terms and distinctions
1.1 “Constitutive commitments”

Here is the country’s President, proclaiming into force (or was he?) a new chapter in its constitutional law:

... We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all. \(* * *\) I ask the Congress to explore the means for implementing this economic bill of rights—for it is definitely the responsibility of the Congress to do so...\(^5\)

FDR listed guarantees respecting jobs, food and clothing, homes, medical care and health, education, and social security.\(^6\) Seeing to these would be “the responsibility of the Congress” pursuant to “a Second Bill of Rights.” That language evokes the Constitution and constitutional law, most certainly not by accident. We know the dénouement: In the years since FDR’s promulgation of the second bill, the idea that U.S. constitutional law might harbor any sort of welfare-state mandate has

\(^2\) See, e.g., EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS: BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE (Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal M. Gross eds., Hart Publishing, 2007). Compare Sunstein, American Constitution, supra note 1 (“Political actors, even those interested in helping poor people, have been skeptical about the likely effectiveness of constitutional provisions that might be ignored in practice.”)


\(^4\) See Sunstein, American Constitution, supra note 1, at 3-4.


\(^6\) See id.
been burnished by pundits, put to the test, and decisively rejected. Or so most well-informed lawyers would certainly report. Was FDR, then, a false prophet?

If he was, it is not for the reason that he sought or predicted developments in our constitutional law that have not, in fact, occurred. Cass Sunstein has a reason for agreeing: He believes that only for want of nail did a post-New Deal constitutionalization of the welfare state fail of consummation in this country. That, however, is not what I mean by acquitting FDR of miscalculation of our constitutional law’s trajectory. I mean that constitutional law never was FDR’s intended or his predicted medium for the second bill; not, at any rate, as we mean constitutional law. FDR’s carefully guarded claim was that Americans had “accepted, so to speak,” an economic bill of rights. To put the matter that way seems more to point away from constitutional law than toward it, as the medium of acceptance.

Toward what, then, did FDR point, if not toward constitutional law? Sunstein has the answer, in the form of what he has neatly dubbed “constitutive commitments” of American society. On Sunstein’s account, these are highest-priority, popular canonical expectations for the conduct of American government. They are the stuff of public political sensibilities and debates, not of lawyers’ constitutional law. Sunstein gives as examples the claims, in the United States today, to be free to join


9 Sunstein considers it likely that “social and economic rights, American-style, would have become a part of American constitutional understandings if [Hubert] Humphrey had been elected” President in 1968. See Sunstein, American Constitution, supra note 1, at 22. In Sunstein’s view, a series of Warren Court decisions seemed to “signal the Court’s willingness to consider” the presence of some sort of socioeconomic commitment in our constitutional law (Sunstein here citing Michelman, Foreword, supra note 3), but the trend was blocked from fulfillment by happenstance: Lyndon Johnson’s Vietnam quagmire, the election of Richard Nixon to the presidency in 1968, and the occurrence of four Supreme Court vacancies on Nixon’s watch. See Sunstein, supra, at 21-23. American constitutional socioeconomic rights, Sunstein surmises, “were a casualty of an election that was fought out on other grounds.” Id. at 23.

10 Might Bruce Ackerman be tempted to claim that Roosevelt’s “so to speak” was a harbinger of the theory of non-formal amendment and “constitutional moments?” See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266-67 (Harvard University Press, 1991). I don’t think so. As Sunstein points out, New Dealers – fresh from frustration at the hands of those Nine Old Men – were anything but keen to “increase the authority of judges” by putting the welfare state into constitutional law. See Sunstein, American Constitution, supra note 1, at 12, 14.

a union without risking your job, to be secure against racial discrimination by private employers, and to social security.\textsuperscript{12} The public’s expectations of government’s recognition of these claims could have arisen, and could subside, without amendment of the Constitution; they exist, in Sunstein’s account, alongside constitutional law, not inside it. By shortchanging the claims or reneging on the commitment to fashion laws and policies with a view to honoring them, Congress would not violate any law. Yet such conduct would, Sunstein maintains, be widely received as a comparably grave violation of the public trust, unless and until there had taken place in our country a mutation in “public judgments” on a scale for which a constitutional amendment would be a suitable form of expression.\textsuperscript{13}

If Sunstein is right about the current content of American constitutive commitments, then perhaps FDR may be said to have prophesied truly our acceptance, “so to speak,” of the second bill. If Sunstein is wrong about that, the President was correspondingly wrong about the impending course of American politics. The President was not wrong, though, about American constitutional law – regarding which, I believe, he placed no bets. Whether Sunstein is right or wrong about welfare-state policies having made it onto the ledger of American constitutive commitments, they more or less plainly have not made it onto the ledger of American constitutional-legal guarantees. Let us, for now, take it as established that they have not. My first question about that is: Why should anyone care, any more than FDR probably did?

\section*{1.2. “in constitutional law”}

Before proceeding, it is best to make sure we know what we are talking about, when we talk about getting socioeconomic rights into constitutional law. Questions can come up at any time about whether this or that scheme of state provision for people’s material wants (Social Security, say, or food stamps, or AFDC) ought to be set in place, removed, or revised. Resolving such questions is not we mean when we talk about getting socioeconomic rights into constitutional law. But then what exactly do we mean? What sort of question, beyond or distinct from those set to policymakers by programmatic issues as and when they show up on parliamentary and bureaucratic agendas, do we take to be raised by talk of putting socioeconomic “rights” into “law” that is “constitutional”?

Undoubtedly, the term “socioeconomic rights” names a certain class of norms, meaning by “norm” simply a guide to conduct that somehow, in some way,
transcends the purely optional. Our question for the moment is what it means for a norm to exist in (or as) constitutional law, and we may as well start with “law.” What does it mean for a norm to exist “in law” – as distinct, say, from “in morals” or “in social practice”? For purposes of the current inquiry, it seems we can best use an answer that holds open the vexed question of whether a norm can be said to exist in law regardless of expected judicial responses to ostensible deviations. Therefore, for now, I shall simply say that a norm exists in law – has been gotten into law – when and insofar as legal inquiry will identify it as one of those norms to which anyone who aims to be law-abiding should, for that reason, normally feel a decisive (or at any rate a substantial) pressure to adhere in the right way. To get a norm into law is to produce a state of public affairs in which that sort of pressure can be expected to impinge on whoever is found or supposed to bear obligations attendant upon the norm. Conceiving of positive legality in such vague, watery, even circular terms is, of course, jurisprudentially tendentious and maybe fatuous – a far cry from “The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact and nothing more pretentious is what I mean by law.” But please bear with me: there is a method in this madness.

Now, what about “constitutional” law? In my scheme of definitions, law is constitutional law when it is binding in the indicated way (at least) on a country’s ordinary lawmakers – meaning by “ordinary lawmakers” whoever is in a position to decide the content of any and all of the country’s law that is not constitutional law. Thus, to get a norm into constitutional law means to produce a condition in which the country’s ordinary lawmakers are brought under the sort of pressure for compliance that legal norms in general are expected to exert. Getting “socioeconomic rights” into constitutional law means garnering that sort of effect for the class of norms to which we give that name.

1.3. “socioeconomic rights”

And what, then, would be that class? As a class, the norms called “socioeconomic rights” envision a desired set of social outcomes – roughly, that the holders of the right should at no time lack access to levels deemed adequate of subsistence, housing, health care, education, and safety, or to the means of providing the same (say through available, remunerated work) for themselves and their dependents. Now, we speak here of “rights,” and that term usually denotes a class of warranted demands, where the warrant may be legal, moral, or “social” as the case...

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14 O. W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 461 (1897).
15 Of course that is not the only way to understand the idea of constitutional law – jurists in the United Kingdom have historically understood it quite differently – but it is the way that is germane to the aims of this paper.
may be. Socioeconomic rights in constitutional law would thus appear to be legally warranted claims to some line of conduct by the state and its functionaries – not least including ordinary lawmakers – by which the desired result will in fact be produced. Again, however, my aims are best served by a somewhat weaker conception. Let us speak, then, of legal obligations on lawmakers to make the best effort they can to devise, adopt, and execute policies and measures that will result in the desired social-outcome targets being hit – leaving open how far “best” efforts will be ones that take due account of certain other, perhaps circumstantially competing principles (liberty, dignity, independence, self-respect, self-sufficiency, the rule of formally realizable law, general economic prosperity) that may appear in the same constitution’s order of values.

Such a best-efforts obligation – what I shall sometimes call a “socioeconomic commitment” – is in fact the sort of norm that I think is usually envisioned by talk of socioeconomic rights in constitutional law. Interlocutors seem typically to have in mind something like the South African model: a declaration of everyone’s rights of access to adequate housing, food, water, health care services, and social security, coupled with a mandate to the state to take “reasonable legislative and other measures, within available resources, to achieve the progressive realization” of these rights. And indeed there is a plain reason why constitutionalized socioeconomic commitments are likely to assume such an open-ended form. How would you make them more programatically explicit, if you could, and hope to get them entrenched in the country’s ranking law – by any process possessed of a modicum of sincerity and prudence?

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16 See, e.g., SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION (Princeton University Press, 2003) 42 (observing that “the logic of positive constitutionalism . . . promises no more than or less than a good effort”).


18 A commentator on a prior version of this paper charged me with changing the subject from “socioeconomic rights” to mere “commitments” that are not true rights. I hope my exposition to this point makes sufficiently clear that there is no incontrovertible, conceptual barrier to positing a best-efforts commitment as the obligation correlative to a constitutional-legal, socioeconomic right. I should perhaps also point out that the exposition to this point circumvents debate about whether the political theory implicitly undergirding any socioeconomic rights that might appear in one or another country’s constitutional law is a “right-based,” “duty-based” or “goal-based” theory, in the classification proposed by RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 171-73 (Harvard University Press, 1977). A right is still a right, regardless of which sort of background theory prompts its recognition. See id.
2. Why care?

2.1. instrumental reasons

Back, now, to our question: If, owing to failures on the part of American governments and legislatures, the “rights” in FDR’s proposed second bill go unfulfilled, then those failures are obviously something for latter-day New Dealers to deplore and seek to rectify. But is there any reason why our constitutional law’s indifference to such questions (if indifference it be) ought to trouble anyone’s mind or conscience? If you thought American governments and legislatures were in fact doing about as well as could reasonably be hoped of fulfilling the Rooseveltian vision, what further reason could you have for caring about what constitutional law has to say about it? In what way, if any, may US constitutional law be thought the poorer or the worse for its failure to speak to the question of socioeconomic guarantees?

The obvious line of response to these questions is instrumental, running along either or both of two tracks: judicial review, and popular constitutionalism. First, judicial review. The point of writing (or reading) welfare-state guarantees into constitutional law might be to engage an influential national institution – the national judiciary – in oversight of the adequacy of the governmental performance respecting them. If you thought that such engagement stood a good chance of lifting performance above an otherwise expected deficient level, that could give you a reason for constitutionalizing the guarantees. Allowing for the obvious – that “no court can ensure” fulfillment of a socioeconomic commitment – you might still find experience suggesting that courts may be able to “take steps to ensure that basic needs receive a degree of priority, and to correct conspicuous neglect.”¹⁹ Not everyone regards that as a good bet, though. Uncertainty remains high about whether such means are, in general, likely to improve performance. Some think it may depend on whether just the right judicial toolkit, and just the right forms of cross-branch interaction, have been successfully designed into a country’s constitutional culture and practice.²⁰

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¹⁹ Sunstein, American Constitution, supra note 1, at 16. As Sunstein has noted, South African experience offers several possible examples. See Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do 221-37 (Oxford University Press, 2001). The most recent instance, at this writing, is Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v. City of Johannesburg, Case CCT 24/07, [2008] ZACC 1. The Constitutional Court held that § 26 of the Constitution, on the right to housing, “obliges every municipality to engage meaningfully with people who would become homeless” in case the municipality exercises its authority (for example) to evict current occupants from housing found to be a danger to them and others. The Constitution, § 26(3), provides that no one may be evicted from their home without a court order, and the Constitutional Court held that a court must refuse an eviction order whenever it finds a lack of “meaningful engagement” with occupants facing homelessness. Id at ¶ 18.

Popular constitutionalism to the rescue? Never mind these courts, you might say; the point of giving constitutional-legal form and expression to moral intuitions of socioeconomic “rights” is to make the Rooseveltian injunction to Congress, or something like it, an explicit part of the conscientious legislator’s standard guide to good conduct in office, and it is furthermore to provide a goad and a platform for a continuing political mobilization to enforce the standard by popular means including the vote. But then are you not getting constitutional law confused with Sunsteinian constitutive commitment? Perhaps foolishly so? Without a boost from a political-cultural condition of constitutive commitment, you can’t hope to achieve the reform of constitutional law you say you want; and once you have that boost, the constitutional law reform won’t matter any more to popular constitutionalists.

How, after all, do you get welfare-state norms into constitutional law when they are not now there? One way is the juristocratic way: judges reading the norms into a doctrinal corpus that does not self-evidently contain them. That can happen, but almost certainly not without the kind and degree of support and prodding from society that the notion of constitutive commitment encapsulates. The other way is express constitutional amendment. Again, however, you cannot hope to pass a welfare-state amendment without first accomplishing the political work required to bring national public opinion to the point of a constitutive commitment. In fact, you will have to bring it beyond that point, because constitutional amendment meets with resistance from sources beyond substantive disagreements of ideology and policy, including both doctrinaire anti-juristocracy (inasmuch as every additional bill-of-rights norm threatens to widen the authority of judges), and doctrinaire anti-amendmendmentitis. Converting a New Dealish constitutive commitment into constitutional law thus requires a major additional push. From the standpoint of

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23 “Juristocracy” appears to be coinage of Ran Hirschl. See Ran Hirschl, *Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism* (Harvard University Press, 2004). On the point of non-self-evidence in the U.S. case, the most telling testimony comes from two egalitarian liberals: Cass Sunstein, who pleads constitutive commitment in lieu of constitutional law, and Ronald Dworkin, who denies that even Judge Hercules can find socioeconomic guarantees in American constitutional law, while “wishing” for moral reasons that the case were otherwise. See Ronald Dworkin, *Freedom’s Law* 36 (Harvard University Press, 1996).
popular constitutionalism, that extra expenditure of effort will be wasted if it succeeds. The new constitutional law, if you ever could get it, would do no instrumental good that the prerequisite constitutive commitment does not already do.

Ah, well, you say, but maybe constitutional law is the will o’ the wisp, the pot at the end of the rainbow. Maybe drumming up a sustained campaign for constitutional-legal reform, whether by the means of amendment or of interpretation, is the best way to build and ignite the constitutive commitment – or the popular, intersubjective awareness of it – that really is the ultimate aim of the chase; never mind what results, in the end, for constitutional law. It offers no answer to my question about why or how, if at all, U.S. constitutional law should be thought the poorer or the worse for its failure to contain a welfare-state amendment, or otherwise to speak to the question of welfare-state guarantees.

In sum, we see that a New Dealer can find plausible instrumental reasons for deploiring the silence of U.S. constitutional law on the matter of socioeconomic guarantees. Those reasons, however, are troubled and contested, and they may not, in the end, be deeply convincing to all whose convictions of morality and policy are strongly welfare-statist. As Sunstein writes, “it is hard to show that nations that are relatively more likely to help poor people do so because they have constitutional provisions calling for such help.” It seems in order, then, to ask what further grounds – of political morality, say – one might turn up for judging a body of constitutional law that contains socioeconomic guarantees superior to one that does not. I believe at least one set of such reasons can be identified. Having got that far, I shall then ask how those who subscribe to the set of reasons I identify might respond to the current state of constitutional law in the United States.


27 For historical documentation, see, e.g., Reva Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: the Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF L. REV. 1323 (2006). In the case that Siegel recounts, the process of struggle for explicit amendment wound up producing a “de facto” equivalent, made up of a combination of civil rights legislation and judicialized constitutional interpretation. The question, though, is how much the constitutional-interpretation part adds to the total effect. See infra note 28.

28 Do not the very same troubles and contestations apply to the first amendment, and every other cherished clause in the Bill of Rights? They do. See generally Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away From the Courts (Princeton University Press, 1999). Their force, however, appears to be greatly enhanced for socioeconomic concerns as compared with the standard liberal freedoms – owing mainly, it seems, to inevitable open-endedness in verbal formulations of constitutional welfare-state guarantees, and the resulting alternative dangers that they, especially, seem to pose: on the one hand, judicial futility; on the other, judicial overreaching. See below, section 4.2.

29 Sunstein, American Constitution, supra note 1, at 16.
2.2. Liberal constitutional morality: the political case

Suppose you find yourself convinced that each of us (who can afford to do so) stands under strict moral obligation to do something toward alleviating material distress wherever in the country (or wherever in the world) it may be found. The ground of this strict moral duty, you think, is facts of suffering and common humanity. Your conviction gives you strong reason for receptiveness to FDR’s account of the welfare-state responsibilities of Congress. Here is why:

If any of us stands under moral obligation to contribute toward the relief of others in need, that is – on the view I am just now attributing to you – simply because others do in fact stand in need and we are able to help them. The sustaining cause for belief in the duty to aid is strictly and simply our knowledge of others standing in need that we could help to cure. But that will not suffice to tell us what to do, if we also will confess (and will you not?) to believing in some self-serving, equitable limit to the duty. It is, after all, extremely morally contentious to attribute the entire load of obligation to any or every individual person. It is one thing to debate whether you or I stand under a moral duty to take in overnight in sub-zero weather the homeless person who fetches up at our doorstep. It is a very different and hugely more contentious thing to suggest that you or I stand under a moral duty, first to sell everything we have, and then to submit ourselves to a lifetime of eighteen-hour days plying the most remunerative trades we can devise for ourselves, in order to turn over all of the net-of-reproduction proceeds to getting every poor person housed, fed, and vaccinated – all of this regardless of whether others who could are helping out at all.

From acceptance of this point, one cannot pass immediately to negative conclusions about moral claims to welfare-state services or individual moral duties pertaining to such claims. The state, for one thing, blocks the way. As pointed out by Charles Fried and Liam Murphy, among others, there happens to exist among us an agent capable of imposing a distribution among citizens of the burdens of aid, and capable also (let us assume) of conducting a fair political deliberation on the scope of needs and the contours of an equitable distribution.30 For those who begin with a conviction of the moral obligation resting on each to contribute equitably toward the relief of others, just in virtue of our common humanity, it makes perfect sense to claim that the state is morally bound to exercise those capabilities, or anyway (if that is too metaphysical a view) that citizens are morally bound to press it to do so and to pay unresistingly the taxes required for fulfillment of the obligation.

Of course it is true that each person, acting alone or in voluntary collaboration

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30 See Charles Fried, Right and Wrong 118-31 (1978); Liam Murphy, Moral Demands in Ideal Theory (Oxford University Press, 2000).
with others, can try in good faith to define and fulfill his or her individual, equitable obligation of aid to the needy, regardless of what others in a position to help may or may not do. But frustration surely awaits whoever will make the attempt, and the argument seems very strong that our efforts along those lines are most effectively and satisfyingly directed to getting the state to tax us in order to pay for activities along the lines envisioned by FDR.

How far have we come? We see that to speak of pre-political rights to basic-needs assistance is an order of magnitude more contentious than to speak of pre-political rights (say) not to be assaulted or defrauded. Arranging outside the state for a fair distribution of correlative burdens seems not to be a troublesome issue with the latter sort of (“negative”) rights, as it is with socioeconomic rights. But still our question remains: What is there in that set of perceptions that makes it even a conditional moral imperative to get a demand for the state’s activity put into constitutional law, over and above uneasy instrumentalist hopes of boosting thereby the chances of a morally satisfactory governmental performance?

In order to make out a further moral case for constitutionalization of socioeconomic commitments – I now wish to suggest – you may have to see the state as a part of the problem, not just the solution. You may have to see the state itself – the very fact of its existence, with our support – as a sustaining cause for belief in our obligations to do what we can to make the state be something of a welfare state. You may have to embrace a moral argument for socioeconomic rights that is not only “goal based” or “duty-based,” in Dworkin’s nomenclature, but “right-based.”

The point is this: The moral issues in this neighborhood would not and could not exist in just the form they do, were certain basic legal-institutional contingencies not as they are. The least controversial, most widely appealing moral case for giving legal force to socioeconomic rights – say, by including socioeconomic guarantees in a constitutional bill of rights – is one that bypasses claims about moral rights and obligations as they might arise in conditions of no-law or so-called state of nature. In this respect, socioeconomic rights appear to differ from legal rights protecting

31 See RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 265-67 (Harvard University Press, 2002):
We may try to live with only the resources we think we would have in a fair society, doing the best we can, with the surplus, to repair injustice through private charity. But since a just distribution [can only be established] through just institutions, we are unable to judge what share of our wealth is fair.

32 Note this is not to take a position on whether or how far the conduct of the activities thus funded should be centralized, bureaucratized, or kept in the hands of state functionaries.

33 See MURPHY, supra note 30, at 74-75, 94-97.

34 See note 18, supra.
against assault, fraud, and the like. Debates over the morally proper scope of such garden-variety legal rights typically reach back to pre-legal, moral rights and obligations as the source of a demand upon lawmakers to do the correspondingly right thing. The most widely commanding moral case for installing socioeconomic rights in a country’s laws – what we may call the “political” case – does not proceed in that way. It by-passes speculation about moral duties to aid rooted solely in facts of suffering and common humanity, rooting itself instead in the historical contingency that law exists in the country. It rests on facts of social cooperation in the form of legal ordering, and the demands for general compliance with the laws that a legally ordered society directs to everyone in sight. Adding this political view to the common-humanity view (which the political view does not challenge or displace) can only strengthen the background moral case for welfare-state activity. There is no apparent reason why adding in the political case should repel anyone who stands already convinced without it. The political view is not, after all, the view that morally warranted concern for others flows “entirely” from “concerns with legitimate governance.”

All legal systems are, at bottom, practices of social cooperation, dependent for survival on the persistence in society of general compliance with the laws and legal interpretations that issue from the practice. They thus all present – at least to broadly speaking liberal sensibilities – the question of political justification or legitimacy, the need to supply a moral warrant for demands for general compliance with laws produced by non-consensual means, directed to individual members of a population of presumptively free and equal persons. In the “political-liberal” formulation of John Rawls, such demands are justified when, and only when, the laws in question issue from a general lawmaking system – a constitutional regime – that everyone who is both rationally self-interested and socially reasonable may be expected to endorse.

On this view, general political legitimacy depends on what we may call a “legitimation-worthy” constitution. To judge a constitution legitimation-worthy is

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to find that its prescriptions, taken all together to comprise a unified political system, have a special kind of virtue or merit: They are such as to cast a mantle of moral justification over enforcement against everyone of approximately all of the laws, rulings, and decrees that issue in compliance with the system they comprise. The aim is thus a constitution whose terms are such as to allow you or me to say, with clear conscience, that any law whose process of enactment and whose content pass muster under its requirements can ipso facto be deemed a law with which all within range have good enough reason to comply, and which we, therefore, are justified in enforcing.

A legitimation-worthy constitution thus does important moral work. It allows for a kind of proceduralization of judgments regarding the moral permissibility of collaboration in the enforcement of laws of uncertain and disputed moral and other merits. Instead of asking whether the contested law is good or bad or right or wrong in substance – a question that seems bound to land us in obdurate division in too many cases – one asks whether it is “constitutional,” a technical and a procedural question. If the answer is yes, those who enforce the law are deemed justified in doing so, no matter (within limits) how morally or otherwise deficient anyone, possibly including the enforcers, may find that law to be. Judgments regarding the legitimacy – meaning the morally justified enforceability – of laws are in that way proceduralized. The burden of justification is displaced from the law in question to the legally constituted political system whence it issued. So what a legitimation-worthy constitution gives us, if we have one, is not just a procedure but a procedure imbued with a special virtue. It gives us, to wit, a legitimation procedure.

But of course not just any constitution that you happen to find in force can be deemed legitimation-worthy just because it is there. And what, then, shall be the test? For Rawlsian liberals – I put this very roughly – the test is that everyone affected, ranking his or her own projects and commitments as no more, but also no less, deserving of consideration than anyone else’s, should be able to accept that constitution as an apt and fair set of governance arrangements for an ethnically and otherwise diverse population of free and equal persons whose various aims, hopes, and projects will often come into conflict. It in order to meet that test, a lawmaking system must include a commitment – a principle – affecting every topic for which a “rational and reasonable” person would demand one as a condition of willing support

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39 How does it work if our judgment is that only constitutions imposing certain kind of positive, protective obligations on governments can be legitimation-worthy? It seems that no law can pass legitimacy-muster under such a constitution unless the government is currently in compliance with the positive obligations required for constitutional legitimation-worthiness. That may be one reason (it surely is not the only reason) for resistance to the inclusion of positive economic, social, and environmental guarantees in constitutions.

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for the system as a whole. It may well seem that we cannot fairly call on everyone, as reasonable but also as rational, to submit their fates to the tender mercies of a democratic-majoritarian lawmaking system, without also committing our society, from the start, to run itself in ways designed to constitute and sustain every person as a competent and respected contributor to political exchange and contestation and furthermore to social and economic life at large.

That quite arguably means that social rights guarantees of some kind must compose an essential part not just of the law but of the constitutional law – the publicly acknowledged, basic terms of the lawmaking system with whose outputs everyone in sight is called upon to comply – of any country committed to a broadly speaking liberal political morality. At least in a constitutional democracy such as the United States, where “the order itself” is equated with constitutional law – where constitutional law stands for the political contract – the result of the Rawlsian conception would seem to be morally required inclusion of a socioeconomic commitment in constitutional law. Expression of the morally requisite systemic commitment will be justifiably suspect if we begrudge it the social form that begets the maximum civic backing the country’s political culture can muster. So, evidently, does John Rawls himself conclude.

Cass Sunstein draws a contrast between a typically American “pragmatic” conception of what a constitution is meant to do and a more typically European “aspirational” conception. American pragmatists, Sunstein suggests, tend to select principles for constitutionalization that “would be a sensible part of an enforceable constitution containing the important institution of judicial review,” whereas European aspirationalists want their constitutions to “affirm, in principle,” their nation’s “deepest hopes and highest aspirations.” The Rawlsian view I have described may be said to raise a question about how far Americans retain full moral freedom to deny or refuse an aspirational aspect to their constitutional law.

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41 See id. at 7, 166, 228-29 (treating provision for a “social minimum” as both a lexically top-ranking principle of justice and a constitutional essential); John Rawls, Justice As Fairness: A Restatement 47-48, 129 (Erin Kelly ed., Harvard University Press, 2001) (same) hereinafter cited as Rawls, Restatement; id. at 127-29 (grounding this moral conclusion in considerations of “reciprocity” and “strains of commitment”).

42 Sunstein, American Constitution, supra note 1, at 14-15 (distinguishing American constitutional pragmatism from European constitutional aspirationalism).
3. Sub rosa constitutional norms

A short digression is now required. Our premise so far has been that American constitutional law is in fact devoid of socioeconomic guarantees. Not every observer agrees. Lawrence Sager, for one, has developed persuasively a notion of “judicially underenforced” norms in U.S. constitutional law. Sager argues that the refusal of courts to give direct remedial effect to one or another claimed obligation of the state does not necessarily signal the absence – or the court’s belief in the absence – of that obligation from American constitutional law. Why not? Because there may exist sound institutional reasons for judicial abstinence from direct enforcement, observance of which neither refutes the principle’s subsistence as one having the force of constitutional law for other actors in the legal system to whose conduct it may apply, nor even denies its bindingness on judges when invoked in some way other than as a ground for direct judicial enforcement. Other ways might include, say, invocation of the principle as a ground of justification for otherwise constitutionally questionable government action. Judicial under-enforcement, as Sager deploys the concept, can thus figure as a kind of qualified judicial enforcement. It is decidedly not synonymous with judicial non-recognition.

The kinds of institutional considerations that may inhibit direct judicial enforcement of certain constitutional norms are well known to constitutional lawyers around the world. There may be lacking a crisp, justiciable standard for deciding questions of compliance and violation. Enforcement may require forms of judicial intervention in public affairs that strain relations between the judiciary and the executive and legislative branches of government; or it may involve the judiciary in making too many subsidiary, managerial decisions that belong properly to the popularly accountable branches of government.

All of these problematic institutional ramifications – inherent contestability of standards, strain on inter-branch relations, excessive judicial engineering – are likely to be salient when the norms that judges are called on to enforce directly involve claims to the government’s active assistance of some kind. The problems more or less vanish when a norm or expectation of assistive or protective action by the state

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44 See above, section 1.2.

45 See, e.g., Sager, Domain, supra note 43, at 240.
is invoked as justification, against constitutional complaint, for action the
government considerately chooses to take. By endorsing the justification, the court
neither ignites inter-branch controversy (rather the reverse!) nor takes on the role of
social engineer; and although the exact, constitutional standard of protective
obligation may be and remain debatable, a court upholding government action shares
with the political branches responsibility for the judgment that the standard is truly
engaged by the class of cases the government has targeted by its challenged action.46

The theory of judicially underenforced constitutional norms is plausible.
Plausible, too, may be an intimation from the theory of the presence of welfare-rights
strands in the fabric of American constitutional law. No such inference, however,
can ever be logically or conceptually guaranteed. Take the case of *Pennell v. San
Jose*,47 in which the Supreme Court upheld against constitutional complaint a city
ordinance requiring lessors of housing to absorb a special decrement in rent, when
required to accommodate the needs of especially necessitous lessees. That holding
might be taken as a sign of an judicially underenforced constitutional right to
housing, here given precedence over a credible complaint of invasion of
constitutionally recognized rights of property.48 Need the holding be thus construed?
May not constitutional law not give the state a license to infringe on certain
constitutional rights in response to a certain sort of reason, without necessarily
obligating the state to take up the license whenever that reason is at hand? When the
Supreme Court construes U.S. constitutional law to permit a state to use racial
classifications in a certain social context,49 are we forced to the deduction that U.S.
constitutional law obliges every state to follow suit in every comparable context?
Must there be no play in the joints?50

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(“For reasons [of] . . . comparative competence[,] . . . courts may rightly hesitate to translate every interest
of constitutional magnitude into a [justiciable] constitutional right and may even defer to the judgments
of non-judicial officers concerning what the Constitution requires.”).


48 See id. at 15 (Scalia, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).

selection among applicants for entrance to law school, in deference to the state’s interest in student-body
diversity).

50 For another instance of what we might call optional detection of a sub rosa socioeconomic commitment
Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Services*, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977); Frank I.
Michelman, *States’ Rights and States’ Roles: Permutations of “Sovereignty” in National League of Cities
v. Usery*, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977). Both the cited articles found signs of a constitutionalized
socioeconomic commitment in an ostensibly federalism-based decision holding state and city governments
immune from national-government wage and hour regulations.
Some years ago, commentators noticed that the Supreme Court seemed to be assigning exceptional weight to certain classes of human needs in various contexts of constitutional litigation. A chief exhibit was a series of decisions in which the Court found that a constitutionally guaranteed “right to travel” bars American states from excluding recent entrants from access to state-provided subsistence allowances and emergency medical services, but not from reduced-price college education or the state’s divorce courts. What was the “source,” we wondered, for the “moral scale” by which the Court measured the acceptability of exclusions? Must it not be constitutional law? And did there not emerge from these cases, then, “the categorical notion of a constitutional right to be provided, in case of need, with ‘the basic necessities of life?’”

Well, no. At least not necessarily. Perhaps what emerges is exactly what the Court said: not a social-democratic (“redistributive”) norm, but a libertarian norm to change one’s state of residence without risk of excessive “penalty” for doing so. No doubt the only proper source for the moral scale on which excessiveness of penalty is measured in constitutional litigation is constitutional law; we were right about that. We had found in constitutional law a clear confirmation that targeted exclusion from whatever emergency treatment centers the state may be maintaining is an unconscionable impediment to freedom of movement. That, however, is a very different matter, with a very different ideological spin, casting a very different sort of shadow over the conduct of civic affairs, from finding in constitutional law a mandate upon the state to operate an emergency treatment center in every locality, free of charge for those in financial straits.

4. Explaining America Away

4.1. Denial

I cite the underenforced-norms thesis not for its possible truth value, but as one among several phenomena that might be collected under the heading of “explaining America away.”

51 See, e.g., Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 7, at 660-64; Sager, Justice, supra note 43, at 98.
56 Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 7, at 690.
57 Id. (quoting from Memorial Hospital, supra note 53, at 259).
Suppose that, on Rawlsian or other grounds, you are inclined to endorse as true the following proposition:

*In prosperous constitutional democracies, where a body of national constitutional law binds ordinary lawmaking, sound moral reasons ideally call for inclusion of socioeconomic commitments in that body of constitutional law.*

And then you observe, with respect to some prominent, prosperous constitutional democracy, that this country’s constitutional law is apparently devoid of socioeconomic commitments. Of course the case I have in mind is the United States.

The apparent considered rejection of socioeconomic commitments from U.S. constitutional law might make you squirm a bit. If you are American, you may not like finding yourself in the posture of branding as morally egregious the constitutional law of your country – not to mention the moral dispositions of the mass of your fellow citizens (insofar as you might take U.S. constitutional law to be an approximately true expression of the prevalent, current value orderings of the American people taken whole). Whether or not you are American, the appearance of a decidedly rejectionist stance in U.S. constitutional law might also make you anxious about your own moral certainties. The combination of these effects might even prompt an impulse toward denial of the fact of rejection that seems so plain to most lawyers.

“In denial” might indeed be one testy way to describe the outbreaks we see of suggestions that socioeconomic rights actually have – right now, today – a foothold in American constitutional sensibilities (the idea of Roosevelt’s second bill as a constitutive commitment of American society) or perhaps even have a foothold in U.S. constitutional law proper, as a judicially underenforced constitutional norm. If you were anxious to get the American people off the hook for a display of bad morals, the idea of constitutive commitments would come in handy. If you were anxious about getting the American polity off the hook for setting a bad moral example to the world, the idea of judicially underenforced constitutional norms would come in handy. Of course this is not to say that either of these ideas is false or mistaken as applied to the American case. Either or both may be true. But neither of these ideas quite gets at what I think may be the most incisive way to explain America away – to explain, that is, how the current U.S. position need not be construed either as normative repudiation nor as evidentiary impeachment of the

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58 There may be some countries properly classifiable as constitutional democracies where national constitutional law of that kind (i.e., that binds ordinary lawmaking) does not exist, and to whose affairs, therefore, the proposition in question has no application.

59 See above, section 1.1.
“sound moral reasons” claim to which I am now assuming your attachment. The more promising escape-way does cross paths with the thesis of judicial under-enforcement. 

4.2. Non-ideal constitutional morality

The key is the word “ideally.” Spare me your groans. This will be no Clintonian quibble. On that word “ideally” hangs a serious moral argument, to the effect that a constitutionalization of socioeconomic commitments is not currently advised for the U.S. by sound moral reasons – it may even be contra-indicated by them – owing to the prevalence here of certain non-ideal conditions.

To be worth much in practice, moral argument must be capable of providing guidance for real-life choices. The choices that morality calls for “ideally,” meaning in some seamlessly conducive world we can imagine, morality may possibly reject in a different, less accommodating world that we actually confront. One can get somewhere by asking whether that might be the case respecting the current rejection of socioeconomic commitments by – in particular – U.S. constitutional law.

That cannot be the case, of course, unless we can first find some respect in which actual conditions in the U.S. deviate from those that are assumed by the ideal moral case for including socioeconomic commitments in constitutional law. Nor can we even start to look for any such deviation until we have in hand some definite content for the categories of ideal and non-ideal “conditions.” (It is not, after all, as though the U.S. faces some special difficulty in affording New Dealish programs.) Here, again, I take my cue from John Rawls. Roughly following Rawls, I shall say that conditions are “ideal,” for purposes of constructing arguments of political morality, when all three of the following conditions hold true:

(i) Sound moral reasons, once publicly brought to light, are always recognized as such by all relevant actors.

(ii) The actors strive, in all relevant cases, to make their actions comply with what the publicly recognized, sound moral reasons require.

(iii) This fact of compliance will be accurately detected by all concerned observers. (In other words, there will not be lingering, divisive

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60 It is also a close cousin of the “institutional” or “pragmatic” explanation for the American omission, proposed by Cass Sunstein, American Constitution, supra note 1, at 14-16.

61 Recall the proposition: “In prosperous constitutional democracies, where a body of national constitutional law binds ordinary lawmaking, sound moral reasons ideally call for inclusion of socioeconomic commitments in that body of constitutional law.”
These definitions broadly follow John Rawls’s conception of “ideal, or “strict compliance” political-moral theory. “Strict compliance,” Rawls writes, “means that (nearly) everyone strictly complies with . . . the principles of justice. We ask in effect what a perfectly just, or nearly just, constitutional regime might be like, and whether it may come about and be made stable . . . under realistic, though reasonably favorable, conditions. In this way, justice as fairness . . . probes the limits of the realistically practicable, that is, how far in our world (given its laws and tendencies) a democratic regime can attain complete realization of its appropriate political values – democratic perfection, if you like.

Ideal theorizing is in order, Rawls suggests, when addressing disagreements about “what conception of justice is most appropriate for a democratic society under reasonably favorable conditions.” Rawls, Restatement, supra note 62, at 13.

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63 To avoid misunderstanding: Ideal theory may be addressed to worlds in which facts of disagreement or “pluralism” are assumed to be among the inevitable circumstances of justice, along with other social facts such as moderate scarcity. Principles and constraints of toleration, neutrality, and public reason will then very likely form a part of the resulting conception of justice. What is publicly-epistemically “ideal” about ideal theory is that it chooses and defends such principles of justice for a pluralistic (disagreeing) society on the assumption that, once publicly brought to light, the chosen principles (of toleration and so on) will be commonly recognized, understood, accepted, and loyalty followed.

64 See above, section 2.2.
expect anything approaching a convergence of respectable opinion about which courses of action open to government at any given time will and will not be consonant with the complex demands of a Rawlsian political morality (which calls not only for constitutionalized socioeconomic commitments but for adjacent and sometimes situationally competing commitments to liberty and so on) or, hence, about whether government’s current performance measures up to what is demanded, as condition (iii) imagines?

Those questions are rhetorical, of course, and I expect almost every reader will nod agreement to their negative insinuations. Is there any way such negations can possibly justify morally an omission from U.S. constitutional law, in the eyes of anyone who considers such an omission morally insupportable under ideal conditions – as opposed (you might say) to simply showing the benighted state of American public opinion? Well, no; not those negations standing by themselves. But they do open the door to a possible argument to the effect that our constitutional law is morally in order, at least for the moment – given one further fact about American society.

That further fact is our currently entrenched reliance on judicial review as an indispensable guarantor of the rule of constitutional law, of the constitutional contract. This is not on its face a fact that falls under the heading of a Rawlsian non-ideal condition. It nevertheless works as a but-for cause of a morally significant, standard worry (as we shall call it) about writing or reading socioeconomic commitments into our constitutional law. It is true, as will be seen, that the prevalence of non-ideal public-epistemic conditions (assuring unquenchable controversy over whether government is at any moment doing what is required to honor a constitutionalized socioeconomic commitment) is also a but-for cause of the standard worry. My point, though, will be that without the American habit of dependence on judicial review as a guarantor of constitutional legality, the standard worry would not arise, or would be baseless if it did.

In a country like the United States, given both our embrace of popular government and the irreducible uncertainty, contestability, and contingency on changing conditions of choices in the field of socioeconomic policy, any constitutionalized socioeconomic commitment inevitably must be couched in

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65 Compare Dworkin, supra note 23, at 33-35 (relying, in part, on historical entrenchment of judicial review in American practice for a defense of judicial review in the U.S. today): Kramer, supra note 2, at 7-8, 227-33. Kramer calls this fact a “modern understanding,” and maintains that its vintage is “recent,” but he does not deny it; to the contrary, he decries it.

66 Rawls is open to the defensibility of judicial review as a component of a legitimation-worthy constitutional regime. See Rawls, Liberalism, supra note 37, at 240.
abstract, best-efforts terms, South African style. But the American culture and practice of judicial review do not fit comfortably with the seemingly boundless, practical indeterminacy of a commitment thus abstractly couched. By constitutionalizing socioeconomic rights in such a form, the standard worry runs, you would force the American judiciary, and especially the Supreme Court, to a hapless choice between usurpation and abdication, from which there is no escape without embarrassment or discreditation. Down one path, it seem, lies the judicial choice to issue concrete, positive enforcement orders in a pretentious, inexpert, probably vain but nevertheless resented attempt to reshuffle the most basic resource-management priorities of the public household against prevailing political will. Down the other lies the judicial choice to debase dangerously the entire currency of rights and the rule of law – the spectacle of courts openly ceding to executive and legislative bodies a nonreviewable privilege of indefinite postponement of a declared constitutional right. In sum, an ostensible act of writing or reading socioeconomic assurances into constitutional law poses may risk serious damage to the integrity (and to public confidence therein) of the country’s practices of constitutionalism, of law and legality, and of democracy, upon which political legitimacy depends. So goes the standard worry.

The worry is credible. It envisions risks with which political morality (not just political prudence) has good reason to be concerned – a point I do not belabor here but which I hope is obvious. More to our purpose is that these are all risks that cannot possibly arise under the public-epistemic assumptions of ideal theory. The risks all presuppose an obduracy and intensity of disagreement between the judiciary and at least some other civic actors, about what morality and the Constitution require of government and whether government is currently conducting itself in conformity to those requirements. No such disagreement can arise where everyone is assumed always to recognize compelling moral reasons once those have publicly been brought to light, and to gauge accurately the best-efforts compliance of others with what those reasons require in a given situation. Bearing this point in mind, we can see how the existence of non-ideal conditions in the U.S. might enable an argument that the morally preferable course here, all things considered, is to exclude socioeconomic commitments from constitutional law, although ideally they must be included.

Something more will be needed, though. The argument depends on a perception of moral risks engendered by drawing the judiciary into confrontations with the government over the government’s performance of claimed socioeconomic

\[67\] See above, section 1.3.

\[68\] See, e.g., Sunstein, American Constitution, supra note 1 (offering the standard worry as a partial, but by itself insufficient, explanation of the American omission).
commitments. The risks in question are ones that can arise only where judicial constitutional review is widely deemed a linchpin of constitutional legality, as it currently is in the United States. Completion of the argument for the defensibility of the American omission under non-ideal public epistemic conditions thus depends on American political culture’s current predilection for judicial review.

The standard worry, with its attendant suggestion of moral risk, depends on the view that a norm can’t be constitutional law, can’t count as constitutional law, without its being turned over lock-stock-and-barrel to judges for enforcement. It was in anticipation of this turn in the analysis that I insisted, in section 1.2, on a conception of a right’s existence in law that did not necessarily posit, à la Holmes, a judicial remedy for violation. For suppose we thought that Americans by and large accepted the more minimal view I offered there of what it means for a right to exist in law – roughly, that those who inexcusably act in violation of the right thereby expose themselves to the special sort of public blame or censure that we would typically direct to lawbreakers. The moral-risk objection to writing socioeconomic commitments into U.S. constitutional law would then collapse. In that case, we should feel perfectly free to write socioeconomic commitments into our constitutional law, while at the same time directing courts to get lost when controversies rage over the sufficiency of the government’s performance of such commitments.

One might draw the following inference: Americans who believe that sound moral reasons ideally require the inclusion of socioeconomic commitments in constitutional law should see it as their moral obligation to do their best to persuade Americans at large of the gap between a norm’s being law and its being available for judicial enforcement – and, hence, of the perfect prudence of writing certain norms into constitutional law while directing a hands-off judicial policy respecting performance of those norms. But even that proposition is not free of doubt. Burke must have his say. In any political culture, at any given time, there may be structures of belief on which confidence in the rule of law, legitimacy – call it what you will – simply depends, and that you cannot pull down with high confidence about what may follow. The less certain you are about all that, the more receptive you may be to a claim that sound moral reasons call – in these United States – for stopping with a New Deal constitutive commitment, if we have it or can get it, and leaving constitutional law alone.

With that question hanging (I do not propose to answer it), we can see how a respectable, moral case for exclusion of socioeconomic assurances from U.S. constitutional law might possibly trump an ideal-theoretic case for inclusion. We can also see how the case may be in some degree special to the United States. If we thought it would be a safe and simple matter here – as it very well may be in many
or most other countries – to write a socioeconomic commitment into constitutional law but instruct the judiciary to leave compliance judgments to purely political forums, the undoubted existence here of non-ideal, public-epistemic conditions would do nothing to impeach the ideal-theoretic case for inclusion (although of course it might fatally complicate the politics of getting it done).

For suppose we did have a clear and widely shared understanding here that a norm can be placed off limits to judicial enforcement without impeaching its status as law that counts as such. The Rawlsian case we reviewed in section 2.2 would then certainly call for inclusion in American constitutional law of an abstractly framed, best-efforts commitment to the satisfaction of everyone’s basic needs. So what if the commitment would have to be so abstractly couched as to become a field for endless political debate? That matters of the deepest political-moral import should be found endlessly debatable in a democracy cannot itself be counted a danger to legitimacy, without dooming the chances for legitimacy in any modern, plural society.69

The analysis I have just completed adds up to this: Whereas inclusion of socioeconomic rights in constitutional law is morally required under ideal public-epistemic conditions, with or without judicial review being also a part of the constitution, moral reasoning under non-ideal epistemic conditions may favor exclusion, but only if judicial review occupies a certain, special place in the society’s legal culture. Where the latter condition is absent, the ideal-theoretic moral conclusion in favor of a constitutionalized socioeconomic commitment holds even under non-ideal public-epistemic conditions.

Thus I have argued. Suppose you accept the analysis, every branch of it. Does it leave us with a new moral ground of objection to judicial review?70 Morally based objections to judicial review usually complain of removal of decisionmaking authority away from those who morally ought to have it.71 Suppose we side with those who find that complaint unconvincing.72 My analysis suggests the possibility of a different sort of moral complaint. The complaint would be that over-dependence on judicial review can ground a situationally valid, moral objection to putting into your constitutional law something that moral ideal theory tells you should be there. The over-dependence thus provides moral cover for a choice that moral ideal theory

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69 For elaboration of this point, See Frank I. Michelman, The constitution, social rights, and liberal political justification, 1 CON 13, 25-30, 33-34 (2003).


condemns. Is that a moral cost to be chalked up against the case for judicial review? It wouldn’t necessarily be decisive, of course; any more than judicial review, at this stage of our history, is sheerly a matter of choice.