From the Vienna to the Paris System:
International Politics and the Entangled Histories of
Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions

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(forthcoming, American Historical Review)
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The twentieth century was an epoch of extreme violence. Yet it was also the era of human rights and humanitarian protection of civilian populations, at least on the level of international conventions and a thick web of institutions designed to implement them. There is a common, perhaps universal, way of explaining this paradox. The commission of atrocities inspires a reaction that leads to the expansion of human rights and humanitarian measures. Stimulus, response. Point, counter-point. The spraying of poison gas over the trenches in World War I results in the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning gas as a weapon of war, the Holocaust leads to the Nuremberg Tribunal and the legal and moral consecration of the concept "crimes against humanity."

True enough. But also not deep enough. On the atrocities and human rights columns of the ledger are inscribed two items that developed in tandem in the latter third of the nineteenth century and received full-blown articulation as part of the Paris peace settlement from 1919 to 1923 -- forced deportations and minority protection. These were (and are) two sides of the same coin (to change the metaphor) -- an entirely new way of conceiving of politics focused on discrete populations and the ideal of national homogeneity under the state. The emergence of minority protection with its quick slide into a concept of minority rights was not just a reaction to various massacres and other atrocities that attracted increased public attention and the interests of the Great Powers over the course of the nineteenth century. Stimulus and response is not the appropriate
metaphor, because deportations and protection ran together -- they emerged chronologically at roughly the same point in time, the 1860s, and were both so often legitimized by bilateral and multilateral treaties that the Great Powers either signed or blessed. And they sit at the epicenter of an array of words and policies that also marked the shift to a politics focused on populations, both within Europe and in the larger European imperial world: civilizing mission, self-determination, minorities and majorities, mandates, and genocide.

At the international level, this tectonic shift in political conceptions and policies I shall designate as the move from the Vienna system to the Paris system. Vienna centered on dynastic legitimacy and state sovereignty within clearly defined borders. Paris focused on populations and an ideal of state sovereignty rooted in national homogeneity. The move from one to the other marks the shift from traditional diplomacy to population politics, from mere territorial adjustments to the handling of entire population groups categorized by ethnicity, nationality, or race, or some combination thereof. The Vienna system is a common term; the Paris system is a phrase we do not use, probably because of the rank failures of the post-World War I settlements. But arguably, the Paris system has had as great an impact on the course of the twentieth and even into the twenty-first centuries as the Vienna system had on the nineteenth. The Paris system has partitioned territories along supposedly ethnic, national, and religious lines; legitimized forced deportations; consecrated civilization and humanitarianism as express political goals; and moved the protection of rights from the purely national to the international level. At the same time, the abject failure of the Paris system truly to protect minorities -- evident most
clearly in the genocide of Jews -- resulted after World War II in the partial (but only partial, as we shall see) reformulation of rights as inhering in individuals, not in groups.ii

My goal here, then, is to locate the origins and determine the core principles of the international system that succeeded Vienna, even when they might not have been crystal clear to the participants sitting around elegant conference venues in London, Berlin, Paris, and Lausanne, nor completely and uniformly implemented. I am concerned with how, within a brief one hundred years, the international system moved from the acceptance and promotion of multi-ethnic and multi-confessional societies and states to a system in which the state was the presumed representative of one nation, with both humanitarian and lethal consequences for populations great and minor. I want to suspend any sense of the nation-state and population homogeneity as natural and inevitable political forms.

The Paris system was the consequence of two preeminent factors: the liberal principles that had risen to domination over the course of the nineteenth century and European imperialism, formal and informal. As their influence expanded into the Ottoman Empire and Africa, the European powers, collectively and individually, had to learn how to manage populations more diverse, more unruly than those they had encountered previously. They confronted rebellions by Bulgarian peasants and cattle-herding Herero, demands issued by Armenian activists and Arab nationalists, power plays by individual European states in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Congo basin. All these unforeseen and conflict-laden situations presented entirely new challenges to the state system brought to life at Vienna in 1815. The Paris system emerged not as some kind of natural unfolding of liberalism, but as the consequence -- at least in part -- of
popular challenges to imperial rule both in Eastern Europe and in Africa and of the excessive ambitions of particular states.

All of this became even more problematic in World War I. The ever-expansive aims that states developed in the course of the war -- a German-dominated Mitteleuropa extending into the Urals; a revived Ottoman Empire purged of Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians; a world of self-determining nations -- all placed populations, not just borders or sovereign rulers, at the core of politics.iii By 1917 at the latest, all sorts of self-appointed movements and spokesmen were demanding national independence; right after the war, the cry of self-determination spread far beyond Europe. The result was the creation of an international system that prized the homogeneity of populations under the state -- even if imperfectly implemented, even if all sorts of anomalies remained -- rather than the acceptance of multi-ethnicity as the preeminent form of society under dynastic rule.

To be sure, prior to the nineteenth century states of all sorts had often focused their energies on particular populations that were typically defined in religious or ethno-religious terms. They had also moved around entire groups. Toleration, protection, and humanitarianism had been proclaimed in international treaties from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 (and even before) to the Vienna Treaty in 1815. But the sea change in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the great distinction between the Paris system and everything that came before, including Vienna, involved two critical points: the connection drawn between populations conceived in national and racial terms and sovereignty, and the development of the civilizing mission into a comprehensive program.iv It is this profound transformation that has led in the modern era to both the
great intensification of forced deportations (sometimes leading into genocides) and the concept and practice of minority rights (later leading into human rights).

All of this makes the history of human rights a great deal messier than many accounts in this newly-burgeoning field suggest. Typically we read of a fundamentally linear, upwardly soaring history that begins (mostly) in the eighteenth century with new conceptions of the self and the great Enlightenment-based emancipatory documents of the American and French revolutions. There may be a few blips in the line, but we get quickly and directly from August 26, 1789 and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen to December 10, 1948 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.¹

But here I want to suggest that the origins of human rights standards are not so pristine and pure, nor so completely and clearly the result of intentional political action. A major part of their history lies in a way of thinking about populations -- group protection and group rights -- that entailed the very same thought patterns that enabled and promoted forced deportations, one of the most egregious violations of both individual and collective rights. It is not an accident, nor mere hypocrisy, that leading statesmen like the Czechs Thomas Masaryk and Eduard Beneš and the Greek prime minister Eleutherios Venizelos (let alone Winston Churchill and Franklin Delano Roosevelt) could move without missing a beat from strong advocacy of democracy and human rights to active promotion of compulsory deportations of minority populations.

All this also suggests that two global areas, rarely if ever considered together, constituted the critical sites for the emergence of the Paris system: 1) the borderlands region of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe, which stretched from the Baltic to the Black and Caspian Seas and into Anatolia and was the meeting point of the Russian,
German, Habsburg, and Ottoman empires, and 2) the zones of imperial influence outside of Europe, the formal colonies and informal spheres of influence, Africa and Anatolia in particular. In these two areas especially the Great Powers proclaimed great principles and had to learn how to manage difficult populations. The results -- minority protection and minority rights, deportations and genocides, civilizing efforts and stark repression -- were not necessarily planned or preordained. Historians have completely distinct literatures for these regions, one for Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe that sometimes (but by no means always) includes Ottoman and Republican Turkey, and still another for Africa. Yet their histories are intimately linked, as the statesmen and experts who developed the Paris system clearly recognized.

International systems enable and constrain politics. They make possible, and they limit, certain kinds of agreements, certain types of interventions, certain ways of thinking. They are never totally fixed and solid and are always subject to challenge. Moreover, whatever particular label one places on an international system -- Westphalian, Pax Britannica, Vienna, Paris -- these are ideal types that designate predominant trends. Within each system there were contradictions and elements of new formations that would fully emerge only later. Moreover, as European power expanded over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries into Anatolia, the Middle East, and Africa, the Great Powers would have to determine how the principles enunciated for the European state system would apply -- if at all -- to the imperial realms abroad.

Conventions like the London Protocol of 1830 and the Berlin Congress of 1878 would
prove to be relevant also for Europe's formal colonies and informal spheres of influence, as we shall see.

State interests as codified at Vienna were quite simple. According to the historian Paul Schroeder, they signified peace, security, and territorial integrity for all the members, and participation in a European state system built on independent states. In Schroeder's unreservedly positive evaluation, the Vienna system meant restraint, commonly agreed upon norms, and commitment to a lasting peace.\textsuperscript{viii}

The Vienna Treaty, like many others before it, had its humanitarian provisions. The Great Powers affirmed the right of Poles to use their own language and to exercise some degree of autonomy. In an ancillary declaration attached to the treaty, the signatories also declared that the slave trade was morally repugnant and "in principle" should be abolished.\textsuperscript{ix} Many treaties prior to 1815 had provided protection for religious minorities. But in none of these cases was it ever contemplated that Maronite, Orthodox, or Armenian Christians in the Ottoman Empire; Russian Empire Jews; or Catholics in Protestant territories could be the source of sovereignty; nor did any of these treaties seriously envisage a civilizing process in which the state, over time, fostered the transformation of Christians into Muslims or Jews into Christians. Diversity under the state was an accepted fact of life (despite anomalies like Spain under Ferdinand and Isabella).

The London Protocol of 1830 was different. By establishing the territorial and political contours of independent Greece, it marked the first time that the powers clearly linked a specific population and sovereignty -- that is, the Greek state considered as
representative of the Greek people. Notably, the Great Powers affirmed the rights of Muslims in Greece and Christians in the Ottoman Empire to pursue their livelihoods and religious beliefs. In sharp distinction to the Lausanne Treaty nearly one hundred years later -- the last of the post-World War I Paris system treaties -- the London Protocol affirmed the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional character of Greece and the Ottoman Empire.\(^9\) The recognition of an independent Greece thus stood on the cusp of two worlds, the one of population diversity, the other of population homogeneity.

The truly critical transitional period from the Vienna to the Paris system came not with the revolutions of 1848, but in the twenty-five years between 1860 and 1885, an era most often noted as the high-water mark of domestic liberal reform and state-and constitution-building in a wide variety of regions and countries -- British Reform Act of 1867, unification of Germany and Italy, the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich, further afield the reconstitution of the American republic in the Civil War and Reconstruction, Russian reforms, the Meiji Restoration.\(^{xi}\) This was also the period when population politics became inscribed at the international level through the Berlin Congress of 1878, the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, and bilateral treaties involving population exchanges. Even though these developments did not yet have the encompassing character they would attain after World War I, the various agreements laid out the contours of a system that defined majorities and minorities in ethnic and national terms. Depending on the category into which they were assigned, populations could be protected, deported, or civilized.

Historians almost never consider the two Berlin meetings together. Diplomatic histories of Europe refer to the Berlin West Africa Conference only in passing, if at all.\(^{xii}\)
Historians of Africa almost never discuss the Berlin Congress. Studies in international legal history reproduce this division. Yet the ultimate documents that emerged out of both meetings, the Berlin Treaty of 1878 and the General Act of 1885, were intimately related, as the participants and their successors after World War I understood.

Both meetings were the result of entirely unanticipated events to which the Great Powers were forced to react: peasant rebellions against Ottoman suzerainty in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Bulgaria, and the excessive ambitions of one state -- Russia in Southeastern Europe, Britain, with the minor power of Portugal in tow, in Africa. The negotiations at both conclaves were rife with competing interests and agendas. All sorts of matters game into play, and the outcomes were hardly preordained. The German chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, convened both meetings to assert the power of a newly unified Germany within the international system and to restore the vaunted balance among the major states that everyone understood as the key to stability. Much that transpired at these gatherings evoked all the elements of the "old diplomacy" of the Vienna system. The Great Powers drew boundaries in Southeastern Europe and Anatolia and in Africa -- notably rolling back Russia's excessive gains at the expense of the Ottomans in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and Britain's efforts to establish exclusive hegemony in West Africa -- encouraged commercial relations, and designated the rulers of new states and territories.

But both meetings also went much beyond the limited politics of the Vienna system. In a ringing assertion of the connection between liberalism and the political form of the nation-state, the Great Powers, in the Berlin Treaty of 1878, mandated religious freedom and civil and political rights for all citizens of the new Balkan states constituted
by the Treaty -- Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania -- and of the Ottoman Empire as well.\textsuperscript{xvi} Most renowned, in part because they were so often ignored and violated, were articles 44 and 61. The former assured the Jews of Romania civil rights, the latter forced the Sublime Porte to guarantee the security of Armenians, carry out "improvements and reforms" of their situation, and submit periodic reports on their status to the Powers.\textsuperscript{xvii} The General Act of 1885, the final document of the Berlin Conference, provided for protection and support of subject African populations in a humanitarian (certainly not a human rights) sense. It enshrined a new language at the international, not just the individual state, level: the language of civilizing mission. The Act required the signatories to work to suppress slavery and slave trading, limit the sale of alcohol, and disseminate Christianity and civilization for the improvement and well-being of native populations. Like the Berlin Treaty, the General Act also mandated the protection of all religious or charitable institutions and religious toleration and freedom of conscience.\textsuperscript{xviii}

Overwhelmingly, the articles of the Vienna Treaty had addressed states, territorial borders, and the proper titles for rulers ("the King of Prussia shall add to his titles those of Duke of Saxony," etc., "His Highness the Duke of Saxe-Weimar shall assume the title of the Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar").\textsuperscript{xix} In sharp contrast, the Berlin Treaty and the Berlin General Act articles dealt in significant part with populations as well as states and boundaries. When the Great Powers denoted Bulgarians, Romanians, Serbs, and so on, they were clearly thinking of them as \textit{nations} or even \textit{races} (to use common nineteenth-century parlance) and not as religious communities. They were admissible to the community of civilized nations, but only if they adopted the practices of civilization, in short, the prevailing liberal principles of the nineteenth century. In this fashion, the
Berlin Treaty provided international sanction for a politics of individual national sovereignties and a civilizing process of East Europeans.\textsuperscript{xx}

Armenians and Jews stood at the nodal points of the emerging system. By their very existence, they posed most acutely all the issues of sovereignty and rights. Both groups lived dispersed over large territories; both looked to the Great Powers as lifelines of support. Articles 44 and 61 made their protection constituent elements of the international system, not the cause of an individual state, but in fact, entangled them in the vicissitudes of Great Power politics.\textsuperscript{xxi} Armenians and Jews would experience both sides of the new population politics -- protection and rights, as well as forced deportations and genocide.

The European powers never thought of Africans as sovereign peoples. Instead, the General Act in essence rooted sovereignty not just in ethnicity or nationality (the tendency of the Berlin Treaty), but in race, in the domination of Africans by settler colonists and administrators dispatched from the European capitals. However, the entire logic of the civilizing mission implied that at some distant point in the future, Africans would become developed enough to exercise sovereignty, with the result that the political map of Africa would more closely resemble that of Europe.\textsuperscript{xxii} Even the deliberations and pronouncements at the Berlin Conference, focused on international law and humanitarianism, resemble much more the Paris Peace Conference and the League of Nations than the Vienna Congress and the Holy Alliance.\textsuperscript{xxiii}

To be sure, neither international agreement created a halcyon period of liberty and progress in the Balkans and Africa. For decades Romania blatantly discriminated against Jews in open violation of the civil and political provisions of the Berlin Treaty. Even
before the genocide of 1915-16, Armenians suffered pogroms in 1895 and 1909 that were far more deadly than those endured by Jews in the Russian Empire. Colonial rule brought with it immense violence directed at African populations and Africans were deprived of huge stretches of territory. Many of the eminently liberal and humanitarian provisions enunciated at Berlin, including freedom of trade, remained dead letters. Bismarck's attention to the plight of Romanian Jews, Ottoman Armenians, and African slaves was remarkably fickle; probably the only difference between him and his counterparts was that he expressed his disparaging views so baldly and dramatically.

Still, it does not suffice to dismiss the rhetoric of liberty and civilization or the provisions providing for political and civil rights as mere window-dressing or hypocrisy. Both Berlin agreements established new standards that made populations, not just territory, the central object of the international system and provided statesmen, reformers, and revolutionaries with powerful rhetorical tools.

As additional signs of the emergence of the Paris system, forced deportations in Europe intensified in number and scale in this same period, 1860-85. Hundreds of thousands of Muslims, anticipating that their life circumstances would be drastically reduced in a Bulgarian or Serbian national state, made their way in long refugee columns to Ottoman domains. Moreover, beginning in 1862 and 1863, the Russian and Ottoman Empires agreed on a series of population exchanges of Christians and Muslims in the Caucasus, probably the first bilateral agreements of this sort. These actions were driven primarily by security and religious concerns; they were not total in character, the way the deportations of the twentieth century would be, and were not yet geared toward creating
ethnic, national, or racial homogeneity as an intrinsic aspect of state- and nation-building. In that sense, they bear all the hallmarks of traditional politics. But the fact that the Ottoman and Russian empires concluded treaties legitimizing the compulsory removal of populations was a harbinger of things to come. Indeed, following the Balkan Wars, treaties among Greece, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire led to new rounds of deportations, each designed to make the respective states more homogeneous. Tens of thousands of Muslims were forced out of their homelands and fled to Anatolia, and some 100,000 Pontic Greeks were compulsorily removed beginning in 1913, and the deportations continued during World War I. Their removal was but one aspect of a burgeoning policy of demographic engineering undertaken by the Young Turks, which would ultimately affect virtually every group in the Empire, most lethally Armenians and Assyrians.

Moreover, in the two decades before World War I, colonial violence intensified as Europeans repressed revolts all around the continent. In the most deadly campaign, the German army carried out a genocide of the Herero and Nama in Southwest Africa (present-day Namibia) -- the first genocide of the twentieth century, not as is so often said, the Armenian. In many ways, the Namibian War announced the opening of the violent twentieth century. Its suppression was not just another chapter in the long catalog of European brutalities abroad. The German army that carried out the genocide came armed with the formal ideology of race. To Lieutenant General Lothar von Trotha, the commander of the German troops in Southwest Africa, the suppression of the revolt was part of an epic, global struggle between the races, a position he articulated with dutiful
references to Charles Darwin. In the aftermath of the genocide that killed somewhere between 60 and 80 percent of the Herero, 40-60 percent of the Nama, Germany established an apartheid system in Southwest Africa, its first explicitly racial state and society.

World War I was a watershed that concentrated and expanded all the tendencies toward population politics. What had started as a war between states swiftly became also a war among peoples. In the course of the conflict the goals of the belligerents became ever more expansive and went way beyond the conquest of territory or self-defense. Germany's imagined Mitteleuropa contained within it an understanding of discrete populations, some of which might be allied with Germany, others, notably Slavs, were slighted for economic exploitation and subjugation to a German elite. In Oberost, the Baltic territory ruled directly by the German army, Germany began to implement the configurations of this future system. In Russian occupation zones in Galicia and Anatolia, Jews and Muslims, respectively, were treated ipso facto as security threats and deported, though such policies were also subject to dispute within Russian ruling circles and between particular ministries and the army command. The Ottoman Empire under the Young Turks carried out the most extreme population politics imaginable by committing a genocide of Armenians and Assyrians. The United States proclaimed a radically different set of war aims, but ones that also involved a conception of discrete population groups, each of which would constitute a state. To every
"civilized" population a state, then the world would be at peace: so ran the Wilsonian ideals proclaimed in the nineteen months of American belligerency.

But the peace settlement went even further and fully committed the international system to the pursuit of population politics. At Paris and Lausanne, where the last of the World War I treaties was negotiated and signed, the Allied powers consecrated a new political language and new policies that, beforehand, had emerged only in fragmentary fashion: majorities and minorities in reference to ethnicities and nationalities; minority protection and minority rights; population exchange and, worst of all, the British diplomat Lord Curzon's coinage, the "unmixing of peoples"; and, finally, self-determination and mandates. Taken together, these terms defined a new international system that received its most bristling articulation in the four-fold creation of the Paris Peace Conference: national states in central and eastern Europe and Anatolia, the minority protection treaties, forced deportations, and the mandate system. The result was a world made safe not for democracy (the hallowed words of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson), but for national and racial politics, an international system focused around a conception of discrete population groups, of majorities and minorities within states that represented one particular nationality and, outside of Europe, of "civilizing" the natives toward self-rule. The liberal and democratic provisions of the treaties were certainly important but they, by and large, did not survive the turmoil of interwar politics and economics in the new states. National and racial politics, in contrast, left deep, defining traces all through the twentieth and into the twenty-first centuries.

<FIG. 4 NEAR HERE>
While the Paris system language and policies marked a dramatic departure in international politics, the Paris treaties were not written *sui generis*, as it so often appears in the literature. The statesmen, the legions of experts that accompanied them to Paris, and other interested parties drew extensively from the nineteenth-century treaties, namely the London Protocol of 1830, the Berlin Treaty, and the Berlin General Act. The drafters also understood the intimate connection between the provisions for the colonial areas and for Europe, although historians have developed entirely separate historiographies, one for the mandates, another for the nationality issues in central and eastern Europe. While the drafters were developing their peace plans, the key figures at Paris also had to respond to unanticipated events on the ground, notably the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire, which required far more extensive consideration of the "minority question" than had originally been foreseen, and the threat and appeal of Bolshevism. Shortly thereafter, they also had to contend with the surprising emergence of Mustafa Kemal's nationalist army in Turkey. And everyone had to deal with the powerful rhetoric emanating from the United States, notably about self-determination.

"Self-determination" was the most famous phrase to emerge out of the entire peace process. Its impact has resonated down to the present-day through countless United Nations resolutions and the battle-cries of nearly every political group that demands independence. A huge literature exists on Wilsonianism and self-determination in particular. Here it is important to underscore that the term, as famous as it became, did not exist in isolation, but was one key element of the general shift toward population politics.
In its origins, self-determination was an Enlightenment concept used in reference to individuals, not to collectivities. Its derivation is especially from German Enlightenment figures, including Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, to early German socialists like Moses Hess and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, all of whom wrote about freedom as a process of individual Selbstbestimmung. By the turn into the twentieth century the term had gained some currency in the socialist movement in regard to nationalities, not just individuals. The Austro-Marxists, searching for a political formula that would meld socialism and nationalism, probably pioneered the use of the term in this fashion, and it was quickly picked up by others, including V. I. Lenin in 1916.

But only when thundered from the stage of the Russian Revolution -- first by the Provisional Government in April 1917, then as a central component of Bolshevik rhetoric from the October Revolution onward -- did "self-determination" become such a hugely successful political slogan. Wilson used the phrase, which he dubbed "an imperative principle of action," in his speech to Congress on February 11, 1918. He and British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, who had adopted the phrase even earlier, were trying to limit the appeal of Bolshevism and regain the peace initiative. Wilson considered "self-determination" synonymous with "government by consent." He was thinking in the democratic terms of the Anglo-American tradition -- that self-determination meant free men joining together consensually to found a political community governed by democratic norms.

Wilson pondered neither the inherent difficulties of reconciling individual and collective rights, nor the implications of his language for political movements all over the
globe, especially those living under imperial control, nor the entrenched difficulties of
carving homogeneous states out of ethnically diverse areas like Eastern Europe and the
Middle East that lacked the particularity of the American ode to immigration. xliv His
slogan resonated far and wide, and immediately raised the difficult issue: self-
determination for whom?

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That issue bogged down the Paris Peace Conference all through the spring and
summer of 1919. The Allies were committed to the creation of a new Polish state, mostly
agreeable to the formation of a Czech state. But the dissolution of the Habsburg,
Ottoman, and Russian empires raised a slew of questions about which nationalities
actually deserved states and what would be their borders. As they granted select
nationalities (sometimes creating those very nationalities, as in the Middle East) their
individual states, the fate of those who remained within the state's borders but were of a
different nationality became a pressing matter. The logic of self-determination, posed
implicitly at the Berlin Congress, became explicit and took on even greater urgency at
Paris. Two solutions emerged: populations could either be protected or removed. They
would be the recipients of rights or the objects of deportations. But first they had to be
defined and labeled as either minorities or majorities, another innovation of the Paris
process.

In its origins the terminology of "majority" and "minority" had strong democratic
connotations. xlvi In the nineteenth century the words had been used in relation to popular
elections and political representation in legislatures. At the Frankfurt and Vienna
parliaments in the Revolution of 1848, the delegates wrestled with the contours of, respectively, a future German national state and an Austrian federal empire. Yet only very sporadically did a few delegates use the words in reference to ethnicities or nationalities. But by the 1860s a sophisticated literature had begun to emerge in legal, philosophical, and political circles, primarily in the Habsburg Empire, about the highly problematic relationship between nationalities and democracy. To most commentators, the existence of defined nationalities had a profoundly limiting impact on the democratic principle. In a homogeneous population, any political minority could seek to become a majority, indeed, had a responsibility to do so. But in a multi-national state, a national minority could never become a majority and the untrammeled exercise of the democratic principle would necessarily mean the domination of one nation over the others. In the view of most writers on the problem, membership in a nation was a fate of birth and ran in the blood lines; a Slav could not become a German, or vice-versa, hence, any democratic polity had to provide protections for subordinate ethnic or national populations.\textsuperscript{xlvii}

By the start of World War I, the intellectual discourse of majorities and minorities had been picked up and developed by three political movements: Austro-Marxism with its program for some kind of federal, democratic-socialist system in the Habsburg lands; Jewish organizations that promoted civil and political rights for Jews, especially in Eastern Europe; and international reform and pacifist associations. All of these groups promoted minority protection in individual countries and at the international level; almost imperceptibly, "protection" and "rights" became virtually indistinguishable. None of the groups fully addressed the thorny relationship between individual and collective rights;
all of them wrote and spoke as if the freedom of speech of individuals and a collective's right to representation as a group were one and the same thing.

But it was only at Paris that this language of minorities and majorities became a central feature of international politics. It was a fateful move with profound policy implications, because it presumed the domination of one population in the state, and others who would be wards of the international system and therefore subject to all the hesitations and contradictions of great power politics. The language and policies of minorities and majorities enshrined a concept of rights as inhering in groups, which existed uneasily with all the democratic provisions for individual rights that the new states established at Paris were mandated to introduce. This same approach meant that if a minority was deemed too large or too recalcitrant, then the solution lay not in protection, not in rights, but in removals -- as we shall see.

In the drafting of the Paris treaties, Jewish representatives exercised some influence, especially on the American delegation. Jewish leaders built on their pre-war advocacy of protection for Jews in Romania and other countries, and found a sympathetic hearing from Wilson, his major advisor Colonel Edward House, and David Hunter Miller, legal counsel to the U.S. delegation and major U.S. participant in the Committee on New States. But Jewish representations were by no means determining; to the extent that they won a hearing, it was because Jewish demands for minority protection accorded with an entire complex of policies in regard to populations, including concerns for the treatment of Christians in Muslim countries.xlviii

The Commission of Inquiry, established by Wilson in 1917 to plan the peace, continually used the language of majorities and minorities. It wrote about the need for
"safeguarding . . . minorities or weak [i. e., colonized] peoples" and ran together widely strewn geographic areas including Russia, the Balkans, Anatolia, Pacific islands, and Africa, indicating how closely the planners linked Eastern Europe with Africa and other imperial zones. These populations needed protection, while new states had to be forced to abide by liberal standards in order to be admitted into the family of "civilized nations."

The major Allied statesmen did not go down the road of minority protection and minority rights willingly or happily. Britain, worried as ever about the impact of such language on its empire, ensured that the minority protection clauses were not contained in the five main treaties concluded between the Entente and the defeated Central Powers -- Versailles with Germany, Saint-Germain with Austria, Trianon with Hungary, Neuilly with Bulgaria, and Sèvres with Turkey -- but were shunted to individual agreements with particular states. With Britain leading the charge, the Allies also denied corporate legal status to minorities, a demand raised explicitly by the Jewish delegations that had gathered in Paris. The Great Powers worried that the new states would be inherently unstable if minorities as such were granted legal status.

While the major figures hesitated, the target states -- Poland especially -- complained and protested; they charged that explicit minority protection clauses signified unwarranted interference in their internal affairs and they raised the telling critique that Britain, France, the United States, and Italy did not have to sign such provisions for their own countries. All to no avail. Too much was at stake. The Bolsheviks were in power in Russia, the Habsburg Empire had unraveled, and Central and Eastern Europe seemed adrift in pogroms and civil wars. The victorious Allies were convinced that as in 1878, the new states were not completely "civilized" and had to be obligated to adhere to the
liberal principles of advanced societies. The Poles, Czechs, and others would get their respective states if they signed -- as they did, even the Turkish government although its immediate predecessor had just committed a genocide, not exactly a stirring example of minority protection and minority rights.

The treaty with Poland, signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, the same day that Germany reluctantly signed its treaty, served as the model for all the other agreements. Its provisions explicitly built on the Berlin Treaty of 1878. Typically, the Polish Treaty did not define minorities very clearly; it simply called them "inhabitants of Poland who differ from the majority of the population in race, language, or religion." But it did afford them civil and political rights. Despite the Allies' rejection of formal legal status for minorities, in reality, the Polish Treaty and virtually all the other agreements recognized Jews and other minorities as corporate entities in the realms of religion and education.

Minority treaties and provisions blanketed Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and other parts of the world in the interwar years. In most of these agreements, the League of Nations was defined as the guarantor with supervisory and interventionist powers in regard to the treatment of minorities (unlike the Berlin Congress, in which the Great Powers granted themselves supervisory rights). Most important, the League of Nations established an elaborate mechanism for protecting minorities. Over the span of its life until 1939, the Minorities Committee investigated hundreds of petitions concerning violations of minority rights and issued hundreds of reports. Sometimes, in very specific cases of discrimination, the Minorities Committee actually had an impact,
even though the overall conditions of life for so many minorities deteriorated drastically in the interwar period -- with the notable exception of the Soviet Union in the 1920s and even the 1930s, which promoted the cultural and economic development of many (though certainly not all) nationalities. Whatever its particular successes and failures, the Paris Peace Conference and the League of Nations brought the concept of minority rights and protection into the very center of the international system. But the very same concept that protected minorities -- the understanding of sovereignty as rooted in the nation -- also underpinned the legitimation of forced removals of minority populations.

The final World War I peace settlement was the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. It is often considered separately -- or, more typically, not at all -- but it was in fact the culmination of the Paris Peace Conference, and not just because it was the last chronologically. Mustafa Kemal's successful nationalist movement had completely undermined the original Treaty of Sèvres between the Allies and the successor state of the Ottoman Empire. His armies had defeated the Greek invasion of Anatolia, launched in 1919 with the support of the British and French, and had assumed control over a significantly larger region than Sèvres had envisioned. In the process, the Turkish nationalist army destroyed the megali (great) idea of a revived Greek Mediterranean empire and the hopes of both Armenians and Kurds for the states that each had been promised by the Allies in the Treaty of Sèvres. The Allies, who convened the Lausanne conference in November 1922, now had a number of critical items that they had to resolve with Turkey: they had to fix Turkey's borders; come to a new agreement on ship traffic through the Straits; determine various restitution and reparations claims; decide on
the capitulations (the privileges that Europeans had been granted in the Ottoman Empire); and settle the fate of the oil-rich city and region of Mosul, whether it would become part of British-dominated Iraq or of Turkey.

Most significantly, Lausanne took the meaning of the five Paris treaties to their logical conclusion by legitimizing and making compulsory deportations of over one million Christians from Anatolia to Greece and around 350,000 Muslims from Greece to Turkey. The Paris treaties were based on the supposed principle of self-determination, which nearly always signified nationally homogeneous states. To some defenders of the Paris system, the "population exchange," as it was called, was a grave violation of the liberal spirit of the Peace Conference with all the provisions for self-determination coupled with minority protection. In fact, the Lausanne population exchange was no violation but an intrinsic element of the principles enunciated at Paris.

There were precedents, many of them close at hand. The population exchanges that had taken place during and after the Balkan Wars were commonly known. At Paris the Czechs had presented a liberal, tolerant approach to nationalities conflicts and continually gave assurances that they would establish a new Switzerland in the heart of Europe. As a result, they generally received a positive hearing during the peace conference. But Thomas Masaryk's *The New Europe* made very clear that the minorities within the new country should be just that -- small in number. Masaryk's colleague Eduard Beneš went further: to the British official Gosling he floated the idea of a population exchange involving Magyars in Slovakia and Slovaks in Hungary. The Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria proved even more decisive: Article 56 opened the way
to a separate agreement signed by Greece and Bulgaria on November 27, 1919, which contained provisions for the supposedly voluntary exchange of populations, ultimately involving 200,000 Slavs in northern Greece and 170,000 Greeks who lived on Bulgaria's Black Sea coast.\textsuperscript{lxiii}

The idea for the Greek-Bulgarian exchange came initially from the Greek prime minister Eleutherios Venizelos.\textsuperscript{lxiv} He was enraptured with the notion of moving around hundreds of thousands of people to create homogeneous states. He had proposed the idea in London in 1913 at the conference to settle the Balkan Wars, and afterward in negotiations with the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria.\textsuperscript{lxv} He raised it at Paris in conjunction with Neuilly, and afterward at the Lausanne Conference. For Venizelos, the peace conference offered the opportunity "to fix the political frontiers of the European states in exact accordance, or at any rate in approximate accordance, with the limits of their ethnical domain. In this way the indispensable basis of the Society of Nations will be created."\textsuperscript{lxvi} Venizelos, born and raised in Crete, was not repelled by the back and forth deportations of Muslims and Christians that he witnessed. Quite the contrary. He became a fervent advocate of a homogeneous citizenry, and just wanted to ensure that the deportations were systematic and total.

At Paris the Allied powers were at first quite hesitant about the Greek-Bulgarian exchange. The inevitable problem of compulsion, of violations of basic rights that any exchange entailed, troubled them. However, their advisors on the Committee on New States were strongly in favor of it, including Miller for the U.S. Indeed, the experts suggested extending the exchange to the entire Balkans.\textsuperscript{lxvii} But the Allied leaders must
not have been too worried, because ultimately they agreed to a "voluntary" exchange, as 
Venizelos had originally proposed.\textsuperscript{lxviii} 

The initial idea for the Greek-Turkish exchange came either from Venizelos or 
from Fridtjof Nansen, the League of Nations' first High Commissioner for Refugees.\textsuperscript{lxix} 
Venizelos finally had come to the realization that the dream of a revived Greek 
Mediterranean empire had turned into the "Asia Minor catastrophe," typified 
symbolically by the burning of Smyrna (Izmir) in September 1922 and the hasty and 
chaotic evacuation of Greeks and Armenians as the Turkish nationalist army took the 
city. Venizelos proposed the exchange to Mustafa Kemal, who responded to the idea 
with alacrity. By this time, hundreds of thousands of Greeks had already fled Anatolia 
for Greece so the convention concluded on January 30, 1923 partly legitimated in 
international law the facts on the ground. The agreement was then attached -- and 
thereby received international sanction -- to the Lausanne Treaty, which was signed on 
July 24, 1923. Article 1 of the convention read:

\begin{verbatim}
As from the 1st May, 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of 
Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, 
and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory. 
These persons shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the 
authorisation of the Turkish Government or of the Greek Government 
respectively.\textsuperscript{lxx}
\end{verbatim}
The obligatory and sweeping character of the exchange could not have been more clearly and forcefully stated. Lausanne enshrined the overarching principle of national homogeneity, even at the cost of moving over 1.5 million people.\textsuperscript{lxxi}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\caption{Near Here}
\end{figure}

As with the minority protection provisions, the major powers and were not enthusiastic about the population exchange; many international legal experts strongly objected to it.\textsuperscript{lxxii} According to the stenographer's report, Lord Curzon, British foreign minister and the major figure at Lausanne, claimed that compulsory exchange of populations was a "solution extremely vicious and for which the world will bear a heavy price for a hundred years to come. He is repulsed by it."\textsuperscript{lxxiii} Later on, toward the close of the first round of the negotiations, Curzon asserted that "all of the delegations, and particularly those of the two powers especially interested -- Turkey and Greece -- view with horror and almost consternation the principle of obligatory exchange." He asserted that the conference had only agreed to it because "the greater homogeneity of the population [will result in] the disappearance of the causes of ancient and deep-rooted conflicts."\textsuperscript{lxxiv} Venizelos claimed that Greece viewed the compulsory exchange with "particular antipathy."\textsuperscript{lxxv} If true (most unlikely at least in the case of Venizelos and the leading Turkish delegate, Ismet Pasha), such sentiments did little to impede the flow of events. Curzon had spent years administering the empire, especially as viceroy of India, where he had sought to engineer the partition of Bengal, reputedly for administrative purposes. But there was an ethno-religious dimension to this effort because it would have entailed a partial separation of Muslim and Hindu populations.\textsuperscript{lxxvi} As for the other powers, their delegates raised only a few scruples.
Two terms entered the diplomatic parlance at Lausanne -- "population exchange" and "population unmixing." Both pallid phrases, they masked the sheer misery and desperation of Muslims and Christians as they were forced out of their ancestral homes, leaving Anatolia for the first time in two millennia mostly devoid of a Greek population, and a good part of Greece for the first time in nearly six hundred years mostly devoid of a Turkic population. For each group, the integration into the Greek or Turkish national state and society was a wrenching experience that continued over generations, traces of which can still be found today. About one-quarter of Greece's population after 1923 was composed of refugees from Turkey; in Turkey the exiled numbers were smaller, forming about 4 percent of the total population, but these individuals were added to an almost continual stream of refugees produced since the 1860s. Neither reality is in the least captured by the term "population exchange," the phrase used in the official documents of the Lausanne Treaty, nor the even more egregious term invented by Lord Curzon, "unmixing of peoples," as if there were something unnatural in the fact that people of different identities lived side by side and interwoven.

The Lausanne Treaty was a major twentieth-century event, even if it is barely known today except to specialists on the region. It settled Turkey's borders and the straits issue, awarded Mosul to Iraq, and abolished, despite fierce Allied resistance, the privileges the European powers had exercised in the Ottoman Empire. But the most dramatic result of the conference was the "exchange" of nearly one and one-half million people. For the first time in a prime arena of international politics, forced population movements were not the result of the exclusive actions of a victorious state or, as in the 1860s and in the wake of the Balkan Wars, bilateral agreements, but of a multilateral
treaty. And statesmen and diplomats remembered. For decades afterward they
considered Lausanne a great accomplishment, a model way of handling ethnic and
national conflicts.

For Europe and Anatolia the Paris system signified national states, minority
protection, and forced deportations, the elaboration of the tendencies of the Berlin Treaty
of 1878. For Africa and the Middle East it meant mandates, the elaboration of the
principles of the General Act of 1885. In conception mandates and minority protection
were closely linked. Both presumed states and societies that were not quite civilized
enough, hence the need for a supervisory power either directly through an international
body like the League of Nations or individual powers acting as "mandates" for the
League. Most observers credit the South African statesman Jan Smuts for originating the
idea in his early proposal for the League of Nations, a draft that Wilson found quite
impressive. But George Louis Beer, a member of the Inquiry and then head of the
Colonial Division of the American delegation, probably invented the term "mandates" in
early 1918 in two articles, one on Mesopotamia and the other on the German colonies.

To be sure, it was the Ottoman and German defeat that opened the way for the
occupation and division of their territories. Already in 1916, as is well known, the
French and British were deep into discussions about dividing the Middle East between
them, which led to the Sykes-Picot agreement. Still, the rhetoric used to justify the
seizure of territory had immediate policy consequences, because it helped inscribe the
civilizing mission into the international system via the League of Nations. The Allied
powers gathered at Paris and the British and American experts justified their division of
former Ottoman territories and ex-German colonies by the contention that the Germans and the Ottomans had proved unworthy of holding foreign peoples and territories. Instead of civilizing, they just exploited and killed. Instead of developing, they simply extracted resources for their own use. For Beer, the German colonies had became a "dumping ground" for "shady characters, family failures and wrecked lives." The German administration's "disregard" for the natives resulted in the Herero rebellion, and its "suppression was marked not only by callous brutality, but by extreme unwisdom. . . . Germany pursued a war of extermination."lxxiii Turkish rule over Arabs was little better: it was characterized by "constant misrule and extortion," reducing once-flourishing lands to poverty.lxxxiv

All the provisions in the Paris documents about the civilizing mission, governance for the benefit of natives, free trade, and eliminating the scourges of slavery and liquor derived from the General Act of 1885. lxxxv The drafters enhanced their application through three instruments: Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, which laid out the mandate principle; the explicit reinscription and revision of the General Act (and the Brussels General Act of 1890); and the various mandate agreements. lxxxvi Article 22 resoundingly proclaimed the civilizing principle:

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle
that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization.\textsuperscript{lxxxvii}

"Tutelage" of the natives would be exercised by particular states acting on behalf of the League.

The treaty went on to distinguish among different levels of development and the extent of mandatory control required. But the details of the mandate system took much longer to figure out and required long, wearying negotiations among the Allies. The British were divided on the mandates issue, the French were opposed.\textsuperscript{lxxxviii} Reluctantly, both had given in to the American lead on the issue, but thought that they could make the mandates simply a different name for outright colonialism. They also wanted to bring in the United States as a mandatory power to ensure that it, too, was invested in the system. Wilson was not necessarily opposed, and supported the idea of the U.S. acting as the mandate for an independent Armenia. Other members of the American delegation wanted the U.S. to assume mandates in Africa, notably for the Cameroons or Liberia (though the latter was formally independent).\textsuperscript{lxxxix} But by 1920, when the mandates agreements were finally signed, the Americans had packed up and gone home and the Senate had defeated the Versailles Treaty with the League of Nations Covenant.\textsuperscript{xc}

Despite the best efforts of British and French colonial officials, the mandate system never became simply a cover for imperial power; it was a key institutional expression of the civilizing mission.\textsuperscript{xci} In fact, the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) established by the League functioned much like the Minorities Commission. Both entailed complex systems of international supervision. The Covenant required the
mandatory power to deliver annual reports to the League Council, which were to be examined by the PMC. The PMC would then "advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates." The PMC sent observers, convened hearings, issued reports. The various colonial powers had to be cognizant of the reverberations of their actions in the League of Nations and in their relations with other states. The mandates system provided an opening for reform-minded organizations and individuals in the metropole, and the rhetorical and sometimes the institutional tools for anti-colonial activists in the colonies.

In short, the mandates system moved the treatment of colonial peoples into the core of the international system, just as the minorities treaties did in regard to minorities. The "sacred trust of civilization," however imperfectly realized, necessarily meant a focus on populations, not just territorial borders and state sovereignty.

In *The Transformation of European Politics*, Paul Schroeder writes that the core features of the Vienna system cannot be found in any of the conference documents. No one of the principals neatly spelled out or issued a ringing declaration about dynastic legitimacy and territorial sovereignty within an overarching European power structure. Only the historian, looking backward, can divine the meaning of the system *in toto* from an array of statements and actions over a long time period. I have attempted here something similar: to locate the origins and properties of the Paris system.

The contrast between the two is stark indeed. Unlike the relative moderation of Vienna, Paris imposed harsh terms on the losers of World War I. Most important, it expanded the definition of state interests into the realm of population politics. It
proclaimed the principles of self-determination and the civilizing mission and defined national minorities and majorities, thereby legitimating systems of minority rights and forced deportations. These were not opposing or contradictory policies; rights and deportations were both manifestations of population politics and were propagated by the very same statesmen and experts.

Those participants who lauded the Paris system did not linger long over forced deportations. Instead, they wrote admiringly about the establishment of minority rights, state borders that were "natural" and conformed with the "unforced aspirations" of people, and the civilizing principle, all now embedded in international law.xciv

But the liberal international system that came to fruition between 1919 and 1923 did not only mean the consecration of rights and progress. It signified also the acceptance of one of the most blatant violations of rights, the compulsory movement of populations. Nor did this system die in 1939 with the onset of World War II. The notion of sovereignty rooted in national homogeneity remains a principle of international politics down to our present day. Even the Nazis, whose drive to establish a German racial imperium throughout Europe marked the greatest challenge to the Paris system, remained partly embedded within it. All through the 1920s and 1930s, the Nazis, along with many other Germans, mobilized the rhetoric of minority rights, lamenting the fate of the supposed racial brethren who lived outside the territory of the state and were consigned to live under less civilized and alien nations. When the Third Reich moved beyond the borders established in 1919, the regime shunted around entire population groups in a way that fell firmly within the common European understanding of politics since the agreements in the 1860s between the Ottoman and Russian empires, the Berlin
Congress, the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, and the treaties of Neuilly and Lausanne. During World War II, the Nazis even got into the business of minority protection in regard to their erstwhile Hungarian and Romanian allies -- while they were annihilating another minority, the Jews of Europe. They established a commission of Italian and German officers to investigate the status of Romanians in Hungary and Hungarians in Romania. And their interlocutors thought of this Nazi involvement in minority politics as simply an extension of the League of Nations Minority Commission. Genocide lay beyond the pale of the international system; forced deportations and the creation of massive refugee streams did not.

In the immediate postwar years, after the Allied victory over the Nazis, the Great Powers created yet another world order and yet another thick web of institutions. The old system of minority rights found few advocates in this setting. But 1945 was not the end of the road for the Paris system. Partly in reaction to the utter failure of the League of Nations minority protection system, human rights took on a decidedly individualistic coloration in the post-World War II period, a perspective enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and many conventions and declarations that followed. However, these subsequent international agreements under the aegis of the United Nations, like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (as well as European conventions) all reassert the "right of self-determination" for "all peoples" so they can "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." In so doing, the United Nations, like its League of Nations
predecessor, has inserted into international politics the fundamental problem: self-determination for whom? Neither the UN nor anyone else seems to have wrestled with the fundamental problem of the tense and tenuous relationship between individual and collective rights.

The post-World War II international system has provided an answer similar to that offered by the League of Nations: if minorities are deemed too large or too difficult, the correct policy is compulsory deportations. The Czech and Polish governments in exile had come to that conclusion already in 1943 and 1944; the Allied powers at Potsdam in 1945 followed suit. The statesmen involved all referenced the Lausanne Treaty as an important and very successful policy. The result was the forced deportations of around 13 million ethnic Germans from all over Central and Eastern Europe. The diplomats who drew the post-World War II partitions of India/Pakistan and Palestine/Israel were also very much aware of the accomplishments of Lausanne, as was the Israeli prime minister, David Ben-Gurion. In the early 1990s, David Owen certainly, perhaps also Cyrus Vance and Richard Holbrooke, knew of the post-World War I population exchanges as they drew up their plans for partitioning Bosnia. It is difficult to say whether the Lausanne precedent is in the minds today of U. S. policy makers in the State Department and Pentagon, who are talking about dividing Iraq and moving around its population to create homogeneous regions. But one point is utterly clear: their strategies rest firmly within the tradition of the Paris, certainly not the Vienna, system.
I am grateful to the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation and the Arsham and Charlotte Ohanessian Chair in the College of Liberal Arts, University of Minnesota, for the research support that made this article possible. For their very helpful critical commentary I would like also to thank the organizers and participants at various lectures and colloquia where I first presented this work: Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster,
Universität Koblenz-Landau, Freie-Universität Berlin, Ludwig-Maximilian-Universität Munich, American Academy Berlin, Princeton University, University of California at Berkeley, University of Puerto Rico, the human rights conference organized by the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin and the Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung in Potsdam, New York University, and Columbia University. Finally, I appreciate greatly the close critical reading provided by Peter Holquist, Brigitta van Rheinberg, and the anonymous reviewers of the *AHR*.

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i Here I would differ with Charles S. Maier's emphasis on territoriality by arguing that the defining feature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was not just a "rescaling" of territoriality, but a profound emphasis on distinctive populations within clearly demarcated territories. See Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era," *American Historical Review* 105, no. 3 (2000): 807-31.


iii For an important argument on the transformational moment of 1914-23 that links social revolution and national development with the critical impact of the Bolshevik Revolution, see Geoff Eley, "Remapping the Nation: War, Revolutionary Upheaval and State Formation in Eastern Europe, 1914-1923," in Howard Aster and Peter J. Potichnyj, eds., *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (Alberta, 1990), 205-46.


On the importance of the borderlands region, see the project statement of *Borderlands: Ethnicity, Identity, and Violence in the Shatter-Zone of the European Empires, 1848 to the Present*, http://www.watsoninstitute.org/borderlands/ (accessed September 11, 2007).

See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston, 1979), esp. 69-73, 99;


See Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital, 1848-1875* (London, 1975). Notably, this is also the period when international law rose to prominence and articulated a powerful progressive optimism. See Koskenniemi, *Gentle Civilizer*.

See especially Stig Förster, Wolfgang J. Mommsen, and Ronald Robinson, eds., *Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884-1885 and the Onset of*

xiii For example, there is no mention of the Berlin Congress in Roland Oliver and G. N. Sanderson, eds., The Cambridge History of Africa, vol. 6: From 1870 to 1905, (Cambridge, UK, 1985).

xiv For example, Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law; Gong, Standard of "Civilization"; and Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer, discuss only the West Africa Conference, while Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire, discusses only the Berlin Congress.

xv Germany in 1878, for example, was embroiled in difficulties with Romania over failed investments in Romanian railroads. Bismarck used Romania's appalling treatment of Jews as a club to win recovery of these investments and other commercial advantages for Germany. See . Fritz Stern, Gold and Iron: Bismack, Bleichröder, and the Building of the German Empire (New York, 1977), 350-93, for a very thorough discussion. See also Carol Fink, Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and
International Minority Protection, 1878-1938 (Cambridge, UK, 2004), 3-38, for an excellent account of the various state interests at play at the Congress.

Diplomatic historians and historians of Germany have largely failed to draw out the significance of the Berlin Treaty's focus on populations. See A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (Oxford, 1954); Anderson, Eastern Question; and Jelavich and Jelavich, Establishment of the Balkan Nation States. Fink, Defending the Rights of Others and Stern, Gold and Iron, 351-93, recognize the pathbreaking character of the Berlin Congress, but focuses only on Jews and neglects the discussions on the fate of the Armenians and other Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Historians of Germany interpret the meeting as an example of Bismarck's artful statecraft, but miss the larger significance of the Congress. See, for example, Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, vol. 2: The Period of Consolidation (Princeton, 1990), 415-41, and Klaus Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich: Deutsche Außenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler 1871-1945 (Stuttgart, 1995), 34-65.

See Oakes and Mowat, Great European Treaties, 332-60, for the text of the Berlin Treaty, and especially articles 4, 5, and 12 (Bulgaria), 335-36, 339; articles 27 and 30 (Montenegro), 345-46, 348-49; articles 35 and 39 (Serbia), 350, 352-53; articles 43 and 44 (Romania), 353-54; article 61 (Armenians), 358; article 62 (Ottoman Empire), 358-59.

Text of Vienna Treaty in Oakes and Mowat, *Great European Treaties*, 37-98, quotes article 16 (44) and article 36 (57).

Again, it is the sovereignty issue that marks off these provisions from all sorts of previous treaties that provided for the protection of religious populations and secured rights of property and person for Europeans abroad, as in the capitulations treaties with the Ottoman Empire and other extraterritorial treaties that the European powers more or less imposed on Asian states. Gong, *Standard of "Civilization,"* 64-69, 140-46, and Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire*, 108-17, overemphasize the continuities from these treaties into the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as do the older works of C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities* (London, 1934), and Ernst Flachbarth, *System des internationalen Minderheitenrechtes* (Budapest, 1937).


See especially Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law*, who argues that only by positing "cultural difference" could Europeans sustain the commitment to the universalism of law and deprive the colonized of sovereignty; at the same time, the civilizing process would move Africans toward sovereignty. See also, Koskenniemi, *Gentle Civilizer*, 71-78, 126-35; Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford, 1997); and Gong, *Standard of "Civilization."*

See H. L. Wesseling, "The Berlin Conference and the Expansion of Europe: A
Conclusion," in *Bismarck, Europe, and Africa*, 527-40, here 527.


xxv Bismarck: "I care for the Rumanians as I do for my glass when it is empty." As for "the Jews, whom I need to coddle, win over and who can be very useful to me in Germany and whom I like to pay in Rumanian money." Quoted in Stern, *Gold and Iron*, 383.

xxvi For one study that takes the civilizing mission very seriously and shows its evolution over time, see Conklin, *Mission to Civilize*.


xxviii See Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914; Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Madison, 1985), 60-77. I thank Peter Holquist for first pointing out to me the existence and importance of the Russian-Ottoman agreements. See also his chapter, "To Count, to Extract, and to Exterminate: Population Statistics and Population


See the notable quotes assembled by Isabel V. Hull in *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca, 2005), 26-33, 47-69, and by Gesine Krüger, *Kriegsbewältigung und Geschichtsbewußtsein: Realität, Deutung und Verarbeitung des deutschen Kolonialkriegs in Namibia 1904 bis 1917* (Göttingen, 1999), 52-53, 65-66 (the Darwin quote), and 78-79. On a theoretical level, see Anghie,
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, 103, on the way Africans' lack of sovereignty meant that the European powers placed no limits on the conduct of colonial wars. However, Anghie connects even these actions with the civilizing mission. But when populations could not be civilized, which was certainly Trotha's view, then the only response was removal or annihilation if they challenged European rule.

Even more than the orders issued in Berlin, the communiqués of local colonial administrators demonstrate the realities of the apartheid system, which involved building separate settlements for each tribe (as defined by the Germans), passports for all Africans with the exception of the mixed-race Reheboth Bastars, "rational" rather than arbitrary corporal punishment, and close supervision even of the Boers. See documents in the National Archives of Namibia relating to the districts of Okahandja and Reheboth: BRE 14/B.10.3/4, 4RS, 9RS; BRE 14/B.10.a/1; BRE 22/E.1.c/10; BRE 26/E.1.8.1/7; DOK 29/E.4.a, Bd. 1/ 4, 5, 25, 17, 31; DOK29/E.4.d, Bd. 7/17RS. See also Jürgen Zimmerer, Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner: Staatlicher Machtanspruch und Wirklichkeit im kolonialen Namibia (Münster, 2002).


While the impact of Mitteleuropa on populations is not fully developed in Fritz Fischer's classic work, the outlines are clear. See Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York, 1967).

On Russian occupations, which often involved targeting specific ethnic or national groups, see Peter Holquist, "It Was a Nightmarish Scene: The Politics and Practice of the Russian Occupation of Armenia," Borderlands Workshop, University of Minnesota, September 2004; idem, "Forms of Violence during the Russian Occupation of Ottoman Territory and in Northern Persia (Urumiah and Astrabad), October 1914-December 1917," Workshop for Armenian Turkish Scholarship, Salzburg, Austria, April 2005; idem, "'In the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 Russian Forces Conducted Themselves Differently—But That was a Different Era': Forms of Violence in the First (1914-1915) and Second (1916-1917) Russian Occupations of Galicia and Bukovina," Degeneraton of Warfare Conference, Yale University, 2004, all cited by permission.

On the importance of the nineteenth-century precedents for the decisions at Paris, see Erwin Viefhaus, Die Minderheitenfrage und die Entstehung der Minderheitenschutzverträge auf der Pariser Friedenskonferenz 1919 (Würzburg, 1960), 46-49, and Flachbarth, System des internationalen Minderheitenrechtes, 1-29, who tracks the precedents back to the sixteenth century and the accords providing for religious toleration. But this position ignores the critical question of sovereignty and underplays the distinctiveness of national versus religious identities. For a statement by one of the participants that also links policies in the borderlands region and Africa, see Manley O. Hudson, "The Protection of Minorities and Natives in Transferred Territories," in Edward Mandell House and Charles Seymour, eds., What Really Happened at Paris: The Story of the Peace Conference 1918-19 (New York, 1921), 204-30, here 209-10. French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, in his cover letter to Polish Prime Minister Ignace Jan Paderewski accompanying the Polish treaty, referred especially to the Berlin Congress
and Treaty and also to the provisions of the London Protocol of 1830. In somewhat exaggerated fashion, Clemenceau claimed that the treaty "does not constitute any fresh departure." See United States, Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Paris Peace Conference* (hereafter *FRUS: PPC*), vol. 6 (Washington, 1946), 629-34, quote 630.

xxxix The planning for the Paris Peace Conference was extensively covered in the older literature, such as, Viefhaus, *Minderheitenfrage*, and Flachbarth, *System des internationalen Minderheitenrechtes*, but is treated only sketchily in the most recent accounts, such as Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World* (New York, 2001), and Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others*.


V. I. Lenin, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination" (1916) in idem, Collected Works vol. 22 (Moscow, 1964), 143-56. See also Manela, Wilsonian Moment, 37-38; Eley, "Remapping the Nation;" and Mayer, Political Origins, 298-304.


On the important and usually neglected history of the terminology of "minority" and "majority," see Kai Struve, "'Nationale Minderheit' -- Begriffsgeschichtliches zu Gleichheit und Differenz," Leipziger Beiträge zur Jüdischen Geschichte und Kultur 2 (2004): 233-58, and Viehhaus, Minderheitenfrage, 8-19, 28-34, 39-53. The tendency to use the term "minorities" for nineteenth-century developments is, in my view, anachronistic. The term does not appear, for example, in the Berlin Treaty of 1878.

The writers and publicists on the problem conveniently ignored the fluidity of national identifications. On this matter, see especially Gary B. Cohen The Politics of Ethnic Survival: Germans in Prague, 1861-1914, 2nd ed. (West Lafayette, IN, 2006), and Pieter Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, Mass, 2006).

For more recent arguments that the Jewish role has been much exaggerated, see David Engel, "Perceptions of Power: Poland and World Jewry," Jahrbuch des Simon-


1 The commitment to establishing states based on homogeneous populations is also evident in the Inquiry's call for maps that were based "racial boundary lines." See "Preliminary Survey," 20.

lii A concise statement of this sort is in David Hunter Miller, "The Making of the League

See for example the memorandum of Polish Prime Minister Ignace Jan Paderewski to the Allied leaders, June 15, 1919, in *FRUS: PPC*, vol. 6 (1946), 535-40, and Clemenceau's response, the cover letter to Paderewski accompanying the Polish Treaty, June 1919 [no further date], in ibid., 629-34.


For a highly detailed delineation and examination, Flachbarth, *System des internationalen Minderheitenrechtes*, 148-53, 360-65, 376-475. In a few instances, minorities, such as the Szekler, a group related to Hungarians, and Saxons (German-speakers) in the Transylvania region of Romania, were granted some political autonomy.

Viefhaus, *Minderheitenfrage*, provides an excruciatingly detailed account of the drafting of all these treaties, agreements, and declarations related to minority issues. See also Robinson, *Were the Minorities Treaties a Failure?*


For example, Robinson, *Were the Minorities Treaties a Failure?*, 57.

Thomas G. Masaryk, *The New Europe (The Slav Standpoint)*, ed. W. Preston Warren and William B. Weist (1918; Lewisburg, PA, 1972). Masaryk writes that because of the legacy of history, there will still be national minorities in the new Europe. "The problem is to make these minorities as small as possible" (84).


Text of the provision in *The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923*, vol. 2 (New York, 1924), 669. See also Flachbarth, *System des internationalen Minderheitenrechtes*, 343-59, whose numbers are too low; Viefhaus, *Minderheitenfrage*, 212-26; and Adanir, "Ethnicities in Thrace," with many citations.

There is no good biography in English, French, Italian, or German, and one is left with older hagiographies in which Venizelos is portrayed by British or American graecophiles as the great reviver of Hellenism in the modern world, e. g., in Herbert Adams Gibbons, *Venizelos* (Boston, 1920). For a brief, colorful account of Venizelos, see MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, 347-65, 429-37. More recent scholarship on Venizelos is evident in Paschalis M. Kitromilides, ed., *Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship* (Edinburgh, 2006), but even this volume cannot always manage to avoid idealized treatments of its hero.


See the minutes, August 6, 1919, of the Council of the Heads of Delegations and appendix F with the draft letter prepared by the Committee on New States along with Venizelos's draft proposal, *FRUS: PPC* vol. 7 (1946): 547-65, 590-95.

Article 1 in Flachbarth, *System*, 345.


Article 1, "Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations," in *Treaties of Peace* 2: 1036.

On the treaty provisions and their impact, see Flachbarth, *System des internationalen Minderheitenrechtes*, 348-59; Renée Hirschon, ed., *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey* (New York, 2003); and Kévonian, *Réfugiés et diplomatie humanitaire*, 71, 109-29. As Kévonian writes, although the Lausanne Treaty defined the communities subject to the exchange by religion (Orthodox Christians or Muslims), it really signified a conception of the nation characterized by homogeneity in which religion blended into nation or race (71, 135-36). For a recent account that mentions the population exchange but somehow fails to grasp its significance, see MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, 442-55. On the background to Lausanne, see Michael Llewellyn Smith, *Ionian Visions: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973). A few areas and populations were excluded
from the agreement and were henceforth designated as minorities. Since the Lausanne Treaty also contained clauses on the Polish Treaty model, the minorities who remained were supposed to be protected and their situation was to be subject to League of Nations supervision.

lxxii For some of the criticisms, see Kévonian, Réfugiés et diplomatie humanitaire, 122-24, 252-61.

lxxiii France, Ministère des affaires Étrangères, Documents diplomatiques: Conférence de Lausanne, Tome Premier, 21 Novembre 1922 - 1er Février 1923 (Paris, 1923), meeting of December 13, 1922, 170-78, quote 175. Curzon disengenuously claimed that Greece had nothing to do with proposing the exchange.

lxxiv Ibid., meeting of January 27, 1923, 307-17, quote 311.

lxxv Ibid., 310.

lxxvi I thank Stephen Blake for pointing out to me Curzon's plan for Bengal.


lxxviii In a most unfortunate move, Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (New York, 1995), takes up the phrase "population unmixing" in an entirely uncritical fashion. For the human tragedy that this pallid phrase masks, see many of the contributions in Hirschon, Crossing the Aegean.


David Hunter Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant* (New York, 1928), 34.


Amid a very substantial literature, see the account in Christopher M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, *The Climax of French Imperial Expansion, 1914-1924* (Stanford, 1981), which largely depicts the ineptitude of French policy in the Middle East and the triumph of the British. On the impact on Jewish diplomacy, see Levene, *War, Jews and
the New Europe, 77-107.


lxxxvi According to Gray, "Introduction," xix-xx, xxiii-xxiv, xxvii, xxxii-xl, the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs created on June 25, 1919 a commission to examine three Anglo-French drafts designed to replace the Berlin and Brussels General Acts. Over two dozen meetings were held from July to September. Article 126 of the Versailles Treaty specifically bound Germany to abide by the Berlin General Act of 1885 and the Brussels General Act of 1890 and any revisions.


lxxxviii For a very critical analysis of French policy, especially in regard to Syria, see Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, Climax of French Imperial Expansion, 180-236.


A point recognized by Colonel House in "Versailles Peace," 443.


Once Germany entered the League in 1926, the Weimar Republic became the major advocate of minority protection, largely by taking up the cause of Germans outside the territorial boundaries of the country. See Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others*, 295-335. On the Nazi period, see Holly Case, "A League of Their Own: The Axis Takes on Minority Protection in the Transylvanian Borderlands during World War II," Borderlands Final Conference, Herder-Institut, Marburg, Germany, 17-20 May 2007, cited by permission. See also her book, *Between States: The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea during World War II* (Stanford, forthcoming). Nicolas Politis, Greece's ambassador to the League of Nations and a jurist, saw Hitler's policies as a consequence
of Lausanne, and noted the similarities with the various exchange agreements carried out between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union, Estonia, Italy, and Latvia, as well as that between Poland and Russia. See Kévonian, *Réfugiés et diplomatie humanitaire*, 127.


xcviii As the legal scholar A. W. Brian Simpson laconically writes in regard to self-determination: "whereas the concept of an individual is fairly straightforward that of a 'people' is certainly not." Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire*, 301.