

ARUDRA VENKATA BURRA

CURRICULUM VITAE

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WORK EXPERIENCE

July-December 2012 **Centre for the Study of Developing Societies**
Visiting Associate Fellow

July 2010-June 2012 **School of Law, University of California-Los Angeles**
Postdoctoral Fellow, Program in Law and Philosophy

EDUCATION

January 2011 **Princeton University**, Princeton, NJ
PhD (Philosophy)

May 2007 **Yale Law School**, New Haven, CT
JD

May 2000 **Brandeis University**, Waltham, MA
BA, *summa cum laude*
Concentrations in Philosophy, Mathematics (High Honors),
and Computer Science (Honors)

ACADEMIC HONORS

2009 **Princeton University**
Graduate Fellow, Fellowship of the Woodrow Wilson Society

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- 2008 Graduate Prize Fellow, University Center for Human Values
Brandeis University
- 2000 Arnold Shapiro prize in Mathematics
Philosophy Faculty prize
Award for excellence in Computer Science
- 1999 *Phi Beta Kappa*
University Scholar
- 1996-99 Wien International Scholarship
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RESEARCH AND TEACHING INTERESTS

Areas of specialization: moral philosophy, political philosophy, philosophy of law
Areas of competence: epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of social science, logic (introductory to intermediate), ancient philosophy (introductory)

PUBLICATIONS IN PHILOSOPHY

- 2006 Joshua Knobe and A. Burra, "Intention and Intentional Action: A Cross-cultural Study." *Journal of Culture and Cognition*, 6, 113-132.
- Joshua Knobe and A. Burra, "Experimental Philosophy and Folk Concepts: Methodological Considerations." *Journal of Culture and Cognition*, 6, 331-342.
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PUBLICATIONS IN LAW

- 2010 A. Burra, "The Indian Civil Service and the Nationalist Movement: Neutrality, Politics, and Continuity." *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 48:4, 404-32.
- A. Burra, "The Cobwebs of Imperial Rule." *Seminar* 615, 79-83.

ACTIVITIES

Law and Social Sciences Research Network (LASSNet)

www.lassnet.org

LASSNet is a network of scholars, lawyers, and activists engaged in research and teaching on legal issues in South Asia. I designed and managed the websites for the first and second LASSNet conferences, held in Delhi in January 2009 and in Pune in December 2010. I was also a member of the steering committee for the second LASSNet Conference. (September 2008-present).

Right to Food Campaign

www.righttofoodindia.org

The “Right to Food Campaign” is an informal network of organisations and individuals committed to the realization of the right to food in India. The campaign has played an important role (among others) in the enactment, design, and monitoring of India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, now the largest social security program in the world. I have been involved in a variety of campaign activities, and managed its website from 2005-8. (April 2001-September 2008).

WORK EXPERIENCE

Princeton Writing Program, Princeton University

www.princeton.edu/writing

As a Writing Center Fellow, I provided feedback, discussion, and advice on writing assignments for undergraduate students. (September 2007-May 2008)

Women’s Rights Initiative, Lawyers Collective, New Delhi

www.lawyerscollective.org/wri/what-we-do

I was a Research Associate for an organization devoted to activism around women’s legal rights in India. My research covered such topics as domestic violence and the law, sexual harassment in the workplace, and constitutional questions dealing with sex equality and rights to religious freedom. (October 2000-May 2001).

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor

PHILOS 246 Ethical Theory (graduate)

Taught a graduate seminar entitled ‘Exceptions and Explanations in Ethics (and Else-

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where)' (UCLA, Spring 2012).

PHILOS 259 Ethics and Value Theory (graduate)

Co-supervised a dissertation writing seminar for graduate students working in ethics (UCLA, 2011-12).

PHILOS 199 Directed Research (upper-level)

Supervised advanced undergraduates on individual research topics (punishment, self-defence, economic justice, philosophy of law, and libertarianism); this involved weekly meetings and intensive feedback on written work (UCLA, Winter/Spring 2012).

LAW M217/PHILOS 166 Introduction to Legal Philosophy (introductory)

Taught an introductory lecture course for undergraduate students and law students (UCLA, Fall 2011).

LAW M524/PHILOS 257B Philosophical Issues in Contract Law (upper-level)

Taught a seminar course for law students and graduate students in philosophy (UCLA, Spring 2011).

Teaching assistant

PHI 384 Philosophy of Law (upper-level)

Led three weekly discussion sections and graded mid-term and final papers for Professor Gideon Rosen (Princeton University, Spring 2008).

PHI 300 Plato and his Predecessors (upper-level)

Led two weekly discussion sections and graded papers for Professor Hendrik Lorenz (Princeton University, Fall 2004).

PHI 200 Philosophy and the Modern Mind (introductory)

Led two weekly discussion sections and graded papers for Professor Daniel Garber (Princeton University, Fall 2003).

MATH 23b Introduction to Proofs

Graded problem sets for Professor Markus Hunziker, Department of Mathematics (Brandeis University, Spring 2000).

COSI 30a Introduction to the Theory of Computation

Graded problem sets and held review sessions for Professor Marty Cohn, Department

of Computer Science (Brandeis University, Spring 2000).

PHIL 6a Introduction to Symbolic Logic

Graded problem sets and held review sessions for Professor Jerry Samet, Department of Philosophy; also created problem sets, gave lectures in the instructor's absence, and helped design the course. (Brandeis University, Fall 1997, 1998, 1999).

PRESENTATIONS IN PHILOSOPHY

- 2012 “Coercion and Moral Explanation”
 Jurisprudence Discussion Group, Oxford University, June 2012
- Comments on “Legal Obligation in a Global Context” (George Pavlakos)
 Visiting Researcher Presentation, UCLA School of Law, May 2012
- “Coercion and Moral Explanation”
 Northwestern Society for the Theory of Ethics and Politics (NUSTEP),
 May 2012
- 2011 “The Significance of Consent”
 UCLA Legal Theory Workshop, November 2011
- “Coercion and Moral Explanation”
 Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of
 Technology-Delhi, August 2011
- 2010 Comments on “The Metaethical Role of Evaluative Attitudes” (David
 Plunkett)
 UCLA Legal Theory Workshop, November 2010
- “The Significance of Consent”
 Princeton Philosophical Society, May 2010
- “The Significance of Consent”
 LEGS Seminar, Program on Law and Public Affairs, Princeton
 University, April 2010
- “Exploitation, Coercion, and Consent”
 Fellowship of Woodrow Wilson Scholars, Princeton University, April
 2010

- “Deception and the Structure of Moral Principles”
Philosophy Colloquium, Georgetown University, February 2010
- “Deception and the Structure of Moral Principles”
Practice job talk, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University,
February 2010
- 2009 “The Morality of Deception”
Princeton Research Symposium, December 2009
- “Coercion and Moral Explanation”
Dissertation Talk, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University,
October 2009
- Comments on “Duress in Islamic Law” (Mairaj Syed)
Graduate Prize Fellows Seminar, University Center for Human Values,
Princeton University, February 2009
- “Coercion in Context”
Graduate Prize Fellows Seminar, University Center for Human Values,
Princeton University, February 2009
- 2008 “Deception”
Princeton Philosophical Society, November 2008
- “Attempting the Impossible”
Princeton Philosophical Society, May 2008
- 2007 “Manipulation”
Princeton Philosophical Society, November 2007
- 2004 “What’s Wrong with Blackmail?”
Princeton Philosophical Society, October 2004
- Comments on “A Bargaining Problem for Luck-egalitarians” (Mathew Seligman)
Princeton-Rutgers Graduate Student Conference, April 2004
- “The Problem of Disagreement” (with Dan Moller)
Princeton Philosophical Society, February 2004

PRESENTATIONS IN LAW

- 2010 “Institutional Continuity and Continuity of Personnel: the case of the Indian Civil Service”
 Second Conference of the Law and Social Sciences Research Network (LASSNet), Foundation for Liberal Management and Education (FLAME), Pune, India, December 2010
- Discussant and co-coordinator of a panel on “Doing Legal Philosophy in India: Reflections on the Legacy of Chhatrapati Singh”
 Second Conference of the Law and Social Sciences Research Network (LASSNet), Foundation for Liberal Management and Education (FLAME), Pune, India, December 2010
- “Colonial Continuities and Constitutional Debate, 1946-51”
 Annual Conference on South Asia, University of Wisconsin-Madison, October 2010
- 2009 “Parliament and the Courts in Independent India: The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951”
 Inaugural Conference of the Law and Social Sciences Research Network (LASSNet), Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India, January 2009
- 2008 “Parliament and the Courts in Independent India: The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951”
 Annual Conference on South Asia, University of Wisconsin-Madison, October 2008
- “Parliament and the Courts in Independent India: The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951”
 LEGS Seminar, Program on Law and Public Affairs, Princeton University, October 2008
- 2007 “The Indian Civil Service and the Raj: 1919-1947”
 LEGS Seminar, Program on Law and Public Affairs, Princeton University, November 2007
- “‘The Indian Civil Service and the Raj: 1919-1947”
 Annual Conference on South Asia, University of Wisconsin-Madison, October 2007
- “‘The Indian Civil Service and the Raj, 1917-47: Thoughts on Bureaucratic Neutrality”

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

Coercion, Deception, Consent: Essays in Moral Explanation

If consensual transactions between competent adults should be respected in the absence of coercion, deception, and adverse effects on third parties, then the moral or legal status of some transactions may depend at least in part upon their status as coercive, deceptive, or consensual. The concepts of coercion, deception, and consent also seem to figure substantively in the explanations of why certain actions are right or wrong: for instance, some acts seem to be wrong *because* coercive. We might hope to find definitions of these concepts which make clear just how they can play this role.

I argue that this search for definitions is misguided, because the explanatory value of these concepts, taken on their own, is limited. I suggest we replace this search for definitions with a search for substantive moral principles governing acceptable ways of getting people to do things. I claim that the answer to this question may depend upon the domain in question: acceptable inducements to transfers of property need not be acceptable inducements to sexual relations. I illustrate these claims by showing that they provide solutions to some important puzzles in philosophy and law, concerning the paradox of blackmail, the ethics of deception in negotiation, and the doctrine of “rape by fraud.”

In “Coercion and Moral Explanation” I argue that the term ‘coercion’ stands for a number of distinct concepts which play different roles in moral thought and talk, e.g. to remove blame from someone who has been coerced into performing a wrongful act, or to indicate that someone has acted wrongfully by coercing another. I claim that, when coercive acts are wrongful, they are not wrongful *because* they are coercive: rather, every wrongfully coercive act is wrongful in virtue of some more basic moral principle (not necessarily the same in all cases) which can be formulated without reference to the concept of coercion.

In “Deception and the Structure of Moral Principles” I argue that lying is not *pro tanto* wrong, for in many contexts (such as games and adversarial negotiations), it is not wrong to lie at all: the permissibility of lying in these contexts is not explained by the presence of countervailing features whose moral force “outweighs” the alleged wrongfulness of lying. I suggest that in every case of wrongful lying, there is some

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broader moral kind, such as the wrong of abusing another's trust, of which lying is in that case an instance.

In "The Significance of Consent" I claim that consent is rendered invalid when it is wrongfully induced, and that the relevant standards of wrongfulness are grounded in substantive moral considerations governing the domain in question. I develop this account of consent to explain how consent seems to "transform" otherwise wrongful acts (such as the causing of injury or pain) into permissible ones (such as surgery or boxing). I also claim that, though non-consensual acts are sometimes wrongful, their wrongfulness is not explained by the fact that they are non-consensual.

Advisors: Gideon Rosen, Philip Pettit, K. Anthony Appiah